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THE ACTIVITY OF BEING A LAWYER: 
THE IMAGINATIVE PURSUIT OF IMPLICATIONS 
AND POSSIBILITIES 
THOMAS D. EISELE· 
Activities emerge naively, like games that children invent for 
themselves. Each appears, first, not in response to a premeditated 
achievement, but as a direction of attention pursued without pre-
monition of what it will lead to. How should our artless ancestor 
have known what (as it has turned out) it is to be an astronomer, 
an accountant, or an historian? And yet it was he who, in play, set 
our feet on the paths that have led to these now narrowly specified 
activities. For, a direction of attention, as it is pursued, may hollow 
out a character for itself and become specified in a 'practice'; and 
a participant in the activity comes to be recognized not by the 
results he achieves but by his disposition to observe the manners of 
the 'practice'. Moreover, when an activity has acquired a certain 
firmness of character, it may present itself as a puzzle, and thus 
provoke reflection; for, there may come a point at which we not 
only wish to acquire and exercise the skill which constitutes the 
activity, but may wish also to discern the logic of the relation of 
this activity (as it has come to be specified) to others and to ascertain 
its place on the map of human activity. 
-Michael Oakeshott, "The Activity of being an Historian'" 
If law as an activity emerged naively and unpremeditated, as a 
direction of attention pursued without premonition of what it would 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. 
B.A., 1970, University of Wisconsin; J.D., 1973, Harvard University; Ph.D., 1984, 
University of Michigan. 
This article is based upon a lecture prepared during my tenure as a 1986-87 
Visiting Scholar under the auspices of the Visiting Scholar Program of the North 
Carolina Center for Independent Higher Education. I thank the Center for its 
interest in my work. 
I hope this article evidences the continuing benefit that I have gained from 
the writing and the friendship of Stanley Cavell, Stanley L. Paulson, and James 
Boyd White. My colleagues, Joe Cook, Jim Kirby, and Tom Davies, have read an 
earlier version of this article and have done what they could to improve it. The 
faults that remain are my responsibility. 
William W. Darrow, John L. McCausland, and Robert A. Yolles, of Isham, 
Lincoln & Beale in Chicago, taught me more about the activity of being a lawyer-
both its responsibilities and its rewards-than I can ever hope to say. I dedicate this 
article to them and their example to the profession. 
1. M. OAKESHOTT, The Activity of being an Historian, in RATIONALISM IN 
POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 137 (1962). 
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lead to, then by now it has hollowed out a character for itself, as 
Oakeshott says, and has become specified in a "practice." Having 
acquired this firmness of character, as Oakeshott further says, law 
may present itself as a puzzle, thus provoking reflection. Thinking 
about law in this manner or mood is something that I wish to call 
"philosophy of law," and this is itself an honorable activity with a 
character and mannerisms of its own. 2 In law school, we most often 
call this mode of reflection on law "jurisprudence." It is under the 
guise of this label that lawyers and philosophers pursue the task 
described by Oakeshott, where we not only wish to acquire and 
exercise the skill that constitutes the activity but also wish to discern 
the logic of its relation to other activities and to ascertain its place 
on the map of human activity. 
Recently a number of people, reflecting on the place of law within 
the map of human activities, have given us ways to understand law 
that are different from those in which law has been approached and 
characterized and placed by traditional jurisprudence. From these 
people I have learned to think of law as a particular kind of activity, 
that of a craft or an art. In the following, I first sketch (in sections 
I-III) this alternative way to think about law, and then consider (in 
sections IV-VIII) some of the differences between this alternative 
vision of law and traditional jurisprudence in so far as they both 
relate or connect us to law. 
I. WHY REFLECT ON LAW? 
I want to begin not by looking directly at law. Whenever one 
tries, in philosophy, to look directly at this object or that phenome-
non, the "thing" -as Wittgenstein warns us-disappears; it proves 
elusive, and we never can get a grasp on it. Rather, I want to think 
briefly about why we even bother to reflect on law. 
The reason that I most often hear given for taking-or teaching-
a jurisprudence course, is that such a course is "broadening" or 
"enlightening" for the students. These terms of self-congratulation 
are offered seriously. But what do they mean? They suggest that 
their speaker conceives of the standard law school curriculum as 
offering a "narrowing" or "dimming" experience for the students, 
turning them into narrow specialists (i.e., professionals). Jurisprud-
ence tries to reverse the process, on this view of legal education, to 
stretch and broaden the law student whose mind has just been neatly 
narrowed and compressed by the standard, core curriculum. Is this 
the point of such an exercise? 
2. Robin West, among others, has begun the arduous but potentially re-
warding task of identifying some of these characteristic mannerisms of jurisprudence. 
See West, Jurisprudence as Narrative, 60 N.Y.V. L. REV. 145 (1985). 
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It cannot be. To think that a jurisprudence course could remedy, 
and is meant to remedy, the purported lifelessness and drudgery of 
the core law school courses is, first, to assign it an impossible task-
one of warring against its own institutional context. This is hopeless. 
Second, it is to concede that the institution within which this course 
takes place has as its pervasive purpose the deadening and stupefying 
. of its students. This describes neither a possible way for humans to 
learn or teach, nor the actual way that humans live in law schools 
as I know and understand them. 
The idea that jurisprudence courses are meant to be broadening 
misconstrues what such a course can truly offer students, particularly 
students in a professional school, who are trying to become profes-
sionals. The point of such a course is not to broaden their experience 
so much as it is to deepen their experience. In particular, it can 
deepen their responses to the problems and possibilities of the profes-
sion that they have chosen. A jurisprudence course can make their 
responses less superficial and more imaginative professionally, more 
insightful professionally. Thus jurisprudence proceeds not by intro-
ducing law students to new or exotic ways of thought, but rather by 
bringing their attention back to the problems and ways of the law, 
and asking them, challenging them, demanding them, to give these 
problems and ways their complete attention. The idea is one of 
penetration and immersion, not expansiveness or release. 
In asking what the nature of law is and why we should care, 
jurisprudence asks students to think again about what they are 
learning when they learn to do what a lawyer does. Thrown back 
upon themselves and their resources in grappling with the materials 
and quandaries that jurisprudence can make available to them, these 
students are expected to see more deeply into the law itself (the 
nature of its problems and its ways of solving them, its materials 
and their limits and possibilities), and to see more deeply into 
themselves (as writers, speakers, readers, arguers; as wordsmiths and 
problem-solvers). A jurisprudence course, on my view, does not seek 
to relieve law students from their professional quarrels with the law, 
but rather aims to place them ever deeper in that crucible of experi-
ence and to test their ability, in such a fix, to make something out 
of the law and out of themselves that approaches adequacy for the 
one and competency in the other. 
I take Stanley Cavell to have spoken truly when he said that 
philosophy is powerless to prove its relevance to our lives. 3 This 
3. Cavell's thought is worth presenting in full: 
[The philosopher's use of "we"] does not, to use Kant's word, 'postulate' 
that 'we,' you and I and he, say and want and imagine and feel and suffer 
together. If we do not, then the philosopher's remarks are irrelevant to us. 
Of course he doesn't think they are irrelevant, but the implication is that 
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means that its methods and its results have the relevance they have 
for us only in so far as we make them relevant, take them to be 
relevant, find them to be relevant. "Then what makes it relevant to 
know, worth knowing? But relevance and worth may not be the 
point. The effort is irrelevant and worthless until it becomes necessary 
to you to know such things. There is the audience of philosophy; 
but there also, while it lasts, is its performance."4 Jurisprudence is 
worth the effort when we become hungry for the knowledge it can 
afford. What kind of knowledge is that? 
Some would say that it is sick, desiccated knowledge. It speaks 
of rules and principles, law and morality, commands and obliga-
tions-primary, elemental matters, fundamental human concerns-
but in a way that deadens these matters, drains them of their 
liveliness. It speaks in a theoretical, abstract, dehumanized voice 
about human matters, and thereby drains them of their natural 
human interest. 
There is much to be said for this criticism of jurisprudence, and 
in a fine book published three years ago, Philip Soper develops much 
of this criticism. 5 Modern jurisprudence is dead, he argues. Deceased 
not in the sense that it literally has passed away from the current 
scene, but rather in the sense that it has lost its liveliness or contact 
with life; it lacks vitality. 6 Specifically, Soper says, jurisprudence 
needs to ask not its traditional abbreviated or truncated question, 
"What is law?", but the more energizing and inviting question, 
"What is law that I should obey it?"? By linking jurisprudence with 
political obligation, or by recognizing the links they already have, 
Soper argues, we can resuscitate the philosophy of law. 8 
I propose to take Soper's suggestion further. Soper criticizes 
jurisprudence for failing to make connections; I think of this as a 
failure of imagination. To make connections between things, to 
discover and examine their relations, to hold them up for a study of 
their similarities and differences, requires imagination. It requires the 
imaginative ability to bring things together in one's mind, hold them 
there, and to reflect upon them. By putting things together and taking 
philosophy, like art, is, and should be, powerless to prove its relevance; 
and that says something about the kind of relevance it wishes to have. All 
the philosopher, this kind of philosopher, can do is to express, as fully as 
he can, his world, and attract our undivided attention to our own. 
S. CAVELL, Aesthetic Problems oj Modern Philosophy, in MUST WE MEAN WHAT 
WE SAY? 96 (1969). 
4. S. CAVELL, Foreword: An Audience jor Philosophy, in MUST WE MEAN 
WHAT WE SAY? xxviii-xxxix (1969). 
5. P. SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW (1984). 
6. Id. at 1. 
7. Id. at 7. 
8. Id. at 7-8, 9-12. 
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them apart, imaginatively, we examine their possibilities; we see how 
they relate to one another, how they are or might be related. For at 
least. some philosophers, this is the center of their work-it defines 
their task and their ambition (and, hence, it defines and limits their 
relevance).9 
Such work of the imagination is something that I find few 
students have the stomach for, or a thirst for. Why might this be? 
I believe that it is because they fail to understand-and we fail 
to help them see-the extent to which the use of one's imagination 
is central to the activity of being a lawyer. Students fail to see that 
the use of their imaginations is not some silly distraction from the 
serious business of the law, nor some extraneous way of escaping the 
demands of their profession, but rather pins them exactly to one of 
the central demands that their clients make upon them as lawyers. 
For what the client wants, and what the profession demands, is that 
each lawyer make use of his or her imagination to make something 
out of the materials of the law, something that responds to a problem 
or conflict in the world. They demand something useful to the client 
and acceptable to the profession. 
This necessary skill of calling upon one's imagination productively 
can seem so amorphous, so subjective, that one may despair of ever 
knowing whether or not one has acquired it, or how one can cultivate 
it. The answer is, of course, that one never knows (in the sense 
desired). This skill is evinced only in the activity, the work, of being 
a lawyer. It can develop (or disappear) overnight, or over a year, or 
over a career. One never knows whether one has the imagination it 
takes to handle a legal problem successfully until he or she does so. 
This self-uncertainty is an essential part of the lawyer's position; 
hence, the ability to deal with it fruitfully is an essential skill for the 
lawyer to have. One deals with it imaginatively, by developing the 
ability to place oneself in the world at a fruitful juncture with one's 
materials and talents, and then by making something out of that 
placement. This is a method by which we can acquire self-knowledge, 
a knowledge of one's location in the world (here, in legal culture) 
and of the meaning of one's actions in that locale, and hence a 
knowledge of the self (its character) as currently constituted. "Know-
ing oneself is the capacity, as I wish to put it, for placing-oneself-in-
the-world." 10 Where does this capacity lead? What does it accom-
plish? 
9. See, e.g., L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 90 (3d ed. 
1967): 
We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, 
is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the 
'possibilities' of phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the 
kind oj statement that we make about phenomena. 
[d. (emphasis original). 
10. s. CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 108 (1979). 
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II. LOCATING ONESELF WITHIN THE ACTIVITY OF LAW 
In his Inaugural Lecture, "Political Education," II Michael Oak-
eshott characterizes politics as "the activity of attending to the general 
arrangements of a set of people whom chance or choice have brought 
together. "12 He then goes on to elaborate this formulation: 
Now, attending to the arrangements of a society is an activity which, 
like every other, has to be learned. Politics make a call upon 
knowledge. Consequently, it is not irrelevant to inquire into the 
kind of knowledge which is involved, and to investigate the nature 
of political education. I do not, however, propose to ask what 
information we should equip ourselves with before we begin to be 
politically active, or what we need to know in order to be successful 
politicians, but to inquire into the kind of knowledge we unavoidably 
call upon whenever we are engaged in political activity and to get 
from this an understanding of the nature of political education.13 
Notice the course that Oakeshott's thought takes here. Since 
politics is a learned phenomenon, it has a basis in knowledge. This 
means that an investigation of politics-of the kind of attention to 
societal arrangements that we call "politics" -includes a study of 
what is learned in learning politics (political knowledge), and this in 
turn takes us on an investigation of how politics is learned (political 
education). On Oakeshott's view, then, political knowledge and po-
litical education are part and parcel of political activity: we cannot 
help but investigate all three if we study anyone of them. One might 
say, then, that the nature of political knowledge and the nature of 
political education are internal to the nature of political activity, and 
vice versa. \Ve cannot understand one unless we also understand the 
other two. 
The political knowledge that specifically interests Oakeshott is 
not, for example, information that we may need in entering politics, 
nor information that we may require for being politically effective. 
Oakeshott's focus, rather, is on the kind of knowledge that any and 
every human being must have in order to be capable of acting 
politically whatsoever. This means, I believe, that Oakeshott is seek-
ing to study the knowledge that we necessarily have or acquire in 
coming to enter the form of life that we call "politics." 
The nature of such knowledge is difficult to specify, but I take 
it to be akin to the idea of transcendental knowledge expressed by 
Kant,14 and the idea of grammatical knowledge articulated by Witt-
11. M. OAKESHOTT, Political Education, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND 
OTHER ESSAYS 111 (1962). 
12. [d. at 112. 
13. [d. at 113. 
14. See generally 1. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (N.K. Smith trans. 
1929) (first published in 1781). 
HeinOnline -- 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 351 1986-1987
1987J ACTIVITY OF BEING A LA WYER 351 
genstein. 1s Such knowledge is necessary knowledge, or knowledge of 
necessities, according to Kant and Wittgenstein. It is necessary in at 
least two different senses. 
First, for Kant, transcendental knowledge is necessary to a per-
son's ability to have any kind of experience, of an object or anything, 
or jor a person to be able to conceive of a world at all. Second, for 
Wittgenstein, grammatical knowledge is necessary knowledge in the 
Kantian sense just stated, but also in the sense that a person cannot 
be a fully functioning, normal human being within a particular form 
of life and still fail to have such knowledge oj this necessary element 
in that form of life. Hence, for Kant, epistemological necessity takes 
the form of a kind of knowledge required in order for anything to 
be an object of knowledge or experience for us. Wittgenstein com-
plicates this notion by making this epistemological necessity applicable 
not only to the objects of our experience (and our world) but also 
to ourselves. Accordingly, grammatical knowledge is knowledge that 
is to be acknowledged if it is to be possessed consciously; in acknowl-
edging it, we come to know ourselves as well as our world and its 
objects of knowledge. 
Oakeshott's interest in political knowledge puts him squarely 
within this Kantian-Wittgensteinian pursuit of necessary knowledge. 
(Oakeshott wants to study "the kind of knowledge we unavoidably 
call upon whenever we are engaged in political activity.") This kind 
of knowledge is the kind of knowledge that jurisprudence equally 
claims to make available-necessary knowledge of law. To the extent, 
then, that jurisprudence offers or invites a study of legal activity akin 
to Oakeshott's study of political activity, it also must offer or invite 
a study of legal knowledge and legal education (in terms of both 
lawyers and laypeople). We need to learn both what is necessary to 
law and what we necessarily know oj law. In coming to learn these 
things, we shall be learning what is required in order for us to have 
or possess so much as a concept of law, a form of life that we 
should be willing to call "law" at all. 
Oakeshott suggests (in his remarks on politics) how a study of 
these necessities might be pursued: 
Our thoughts on political education, then, might be supposed to 
spring from our understanding of political activity and the kind of 
knowledge it involves. And it would appear that what is wanted at 
this point is a definition of political activity from which to draw 
some conclusions. But this, I think, would be a. mistaken way of 
going about our business. What we require is not so much a 
definition of politics from which to deduce the character of political 
education, as an understanding of political activity which includes 
15. See generally L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPIDCAL INVESTIGATIONS (3d ed. 
1967). 
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a recognition of the sort of education it involves. For, to understand 
an activity is to know it as a concrete whole; it is to recognize the 
activity as having the source of its movement within itself. An 
understanding which leaves the activity in debt to something outside 
itself is, for that reason, an inadequate understanding. And if 
political activity is impossible without a certain kind of knowledge 
and a certain sort of education, then this knowledge and education 
are not mere appendages to the activity but are part of the activity 
itself and must be incorporated in our understanding of it. We 
should not, therefore, seek a definition of politics in order to deduce 
from it the character of political knowledge and education, but 
rather observe the kind of knowledge and education which is 
inherent in any understanding of political activity, and use this 
observation as a means of improving our understanding of politics. 16 
The kind of knowledge that we have about an activity and the 
kind of education we receive in an activity are characteristic of that 
activity. This means two things: First, they are characteristic of it 
(normal identifiers of it); second, they characterize it (represent or 
reveal it) to us. In Wittgenstein's terms, our possible forms of 
knowledge of an activity and the various ways in which we receive 
an education in an activity are our criteria of that activity. They are 
our ways both of identifying that activity and of knowing that 
activity. Accordingly, we get to know the nature of an activity not 
by defining it (in the traditional sense of giving a definition of a 
thing), but exactly by exploring (Oakeshott says "observing") the 
ways in which we learn and practice and talk about the activity. 
These connections are the sort of criterial and grammatical intricacies 
that Wittgenstein studies in his later philosophyY 
This is one way in which we can come to know and understand 
the activity in question. But it also is one way in which we can come 
to know ourselves, because the criteria being investigated locate 
ourselves with respect to this activity. Wittgenstein's emphasis on our 
grammatical knowledge, necessary knowledge, is in part an emphasis 
on the ways we have of relating ourselves to various phenomena or 
experiences. These relations or connections are criterial, and they 
serve to orient us with respect to the phenomenon or experience (or 
16. OAKESHOTT, supra note 11, at 113. 
17. Throughout this article, I shall be entering claims about and characteri-
zations of various philosophers (e.g., Kant, Wittgenstein) that I cannot hope to 
support in this place at this time. Since much of my understanding of these 
philosophers derives from the seminal work of Stanley Cavell, I have tried to provide 
ample citations to his work for those readers who may be interested in testing my 
assertions. My thoughts on Wittgenstein's later philosophy are developed more fully 
in my unpublished doctoral dissertation. See T. Eisele, Wittgenstein's Normative 
Naturalism: The Point of His Practice (1984) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, 
Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan). 
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object or activity) being studied. IS In locating the activity of law by 
way of such studies, we end up locating ourselves with respect to it, 
and come to know both at the same time. 
This sort of study can take place imaginatively, by examining 
criterial relations and grammatical connections, and I have said that 
in jurisprudence the failure to mark such relations or make such 
connections, as Soper alleges, is symptomatic of a failure of the 
imagination. I want to enlarge on this. The work of the imagination 
in making connections among things requires of us a willingness and 
ability to make explicit the implications and possibilities of our words, 
our actions, and our lives (here, our lives in the medium of the law). 
In argument, in analysis, in analogies, in narrative, in examples, in 
case studies, in legislative histories-howsoever we do it-we explicate 
our laws, our legal processes, and our legal activities. 
These exercises amount to the realization of the possibilities of 
these materials on many levels. They may encompass the sustained 
elaboration or application of a particular concept, such as "reason-
able man" or "negligence" or "proximate cause" in torts, or "pos-
session" or "perpetuity" or "real covenant" in property, or "offer 
and acceptance" or "consideration" or "mistake" in contracts. They 
may encompass the complex development of a rule or doctrine, such 
as the implied warranty of habitability in housing or the Rule against 
Perpetuities, with its many interrelated issues and factors. (In terms 
of the latter, for example, think of the many separate but related 
questions that can be asked in attempting to realize the implications 
or possibilities of the language and policy of the Rule: Will the Rule 
apply to executory interests as well as contingent remainders? What 
is the meaning of "vest" for purposes of the Rule? Who can be a 
measuring life or a "life in being"? Shall charitable gifts be exempted 
from the Rule? Can a court .reform a grant or gift so as to bring it 
into compliance with the Rule?) Or they may encompass the evolution 
of an entire area of the law, such as the change in conception of the 
residential lease, "from status to contract to property to modern 
contract." 19 
Not everything is possible everywhere or at any time. Articulating 
the implicit relations and possibilities of any human activity is a 
fragile endeavor, encompassing indefinitely many particulars that are 
intricately related within the nuturing wholes that we call "activities." 
And it would be a misleadingly atomistic analogy to say that we are 
simply trying to put together the pieces of an intricate puzzle. Rather, 
we are trying to understand the whole of an activity in its autonomy 
18. See S. CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 81-84, 93-94, 96, 100, 107-108 
(1979). 
19. Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective, 9 KAN. L. REV. 369, 
377 (1961). 
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and Integrity, as its own generator and sustainer of energy, life, 
meaning, and significance, even while we equally recognize that no 
activity is an island unto itself. As Oakeshott reminds us, "[T]o 
understand an activity is to know it as a concrete whole; it is to 
recognize the activity as having the source of its movement within 
itself. An understanding which leaves the activity in debt to something 
outside itself is, for that reason, an inadequate understanding. "20 To 
understand an activity in its autonomy includes understanding its 
purpose or point, its reason for being, and its sustaining and possible 
directions of development. But such understanding also requires a 
comprehension of its relations with other activities, its similarities to 
and differences from them, as well as its integration with life as a 
whole. 
Activities function within a particular context or frame, within a 
particular time and place, within a particular culture, within a par-
ticular language, within a particular world, none of which need be 
substantially articulated for us to participate in them. Nor need any 
particular one of their possibilities be realized at any time (or ever) 
by anyone. To be able to participate in them does not require an 
articulation of their implications, or the realization of anyone of 
their particular possibilities. To know them (in the sense of knowing 
how to do them) does not require an articulation either. But an 
articulation of them may help us understand them, and understanding 
may lead to better mastery of them, better practice. And to under-
stand them, we must make them explicit, which requires that we 
investigate their possibilities (by acknowledging them, if nothing else). 
This is very difficult to do but it is the challenge of philosophy. 
Soper senses that political theory is implicit in the issues and 
arguments of jurisprudence, and A Theory of Law articulates some 
of the political questions implicit in traditional jurisprudential con-
cerns. In this sense, Soper is imaginatively making something out of 
the possibilities of law and legal theory. However one is struck by 
Soper's particular arguments and analyses concerning this connection 
between disciplines, I find his general strategy to be undeniably 
proper. Jurisprudence, if it is to understand itself and its topic, the 
nature of law, must connect itself with other concepts and commit-
ments and cares and concerns (Le., with other human activities and 
fields). It is only through the discovery of such connections, the 
imaginative prodding and proposing of such connections, that we 
actually come to understand law for what it is, just as it is through 
such a process that we actually place law within the world of human 
life and activity, and locate ourselves along with it. By imaginatively 
investigating the implications and possibilities of the activity of law, 
we locate ourselves within it, with respect to it. 
20. 0 AKESIIOTT, supra note II, at 113. 
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III. ACTING WITH WORDS BY MAKING MEANING WITH OTHERS 
The moral of Soper's strategy (in its application to other fields) 
is something that I find demonstrated ably by Wittgenstein in his 
later philosophy, in his grammatical investigations, which consist of 
tracing and placing the implicit and possible criterial connections 
between concepts; and by Michael Oakeshott, in his writings about 
politics, history, and morality, where (for example) he emphasizes 
our need and ability to elaborate the implications and possibilities of 
our political lives, which activity of elaboration or articulation he 
characterizes as "the pursuit of intimations. "21 
In its application to law, I find the moral or" Soper's strategy 
demonstrated superbly in the writings of James Boyd White, whose 
first book is fittingly entitled, The Legal Imagination. 22 This book 
brings legal forms of life and expression together with forms of life 
and expression found in literature, philosophy, history, and anthro-
pology, and examines their connections and disconnections, their 
relations. This juxtaposition reveals some of the conditions of thought 
and expression under which lawyers work, either shared or unshared 
with other disciplines. What ends up being sketched is the lawyer's 
position as a user of language.23 Knowledge of this position, its 
conditions and limitations and resources and moves, is necessary for 
any lawyer if he or she is to master the activity of being a lawyer. 
In thinking about the lawyer as a user of language, as a speaker 
and writer, one may naturally think in terms of literary analogues, 
and White does so. In The Legal Imagination, he appeals to his 
experience of literature when he characterizes and contrasts his ex-
perience of acquiring the skills and understandings of a lawyer, and 
he claims that his own reading and understanding of literature 
informs (and, reciprocally, is informed by) his reading and under-
standing of law. In another essay, reproduced in his third book, 
Heracles' Bow,24 White goes on to say, "The lawyer and the literary 
critic, as readers of texts, face difficulties and enjoy opportunities 
that are far more alike than may seem at first to be the case: in a 
deep sense, I believe, they are the same. "25 I want to examine some 
21. Id. at 124, 133-136. 
22. J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973) [hereinafter LEGAL IMAGINA-
TION}. 
23. I have said something more specific about "the lawyer's position" in 
terms of being a user of language, in an earlier discussion of White's work and 
contemporary philosophy. See Eisele, The Legal Imagination and Language, 47 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 363 (1976). 
24. J. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow (1985) [hereinafter HERACLES' Bowl. 
25. White, Law as Language, 60 TEX. L. REV. 415, 415 (1982) reprinted as 
Reading Law and Reading Literature, in HERACLES' Bow, supra note 24, at 77, 78 
(slightly modified). 
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of these difficulties and opportunities now, because it is through a 
study of them that White furnishes us with some of the necessary 
knowledge of law that traditional jurisprudence ignores or denies. 
The kind of 'action with words' that we shall examine thus covers 
an enormous range, including in principle all that goes into the 
management of social life in language, from relations of great 
intimacy to those of great publicity, such as those that constitute 
national politics in Athens, England, or America. This means that 
the kind of text-making that [When Words Lose Their Meaning] is 
about is not limited to the elevated forms of poetry and history and 
philosophy and law but includes what happens whenever any of us 
acts with words in our own lives to claim a meaning for experience 
or to establish a relation with another. 26 
White sees the lawyer as someone who acts with words, one 
whose work is largely a matter of intellectual linguistic products and 
performances. These performances yield texts; so, in an obvious way, 
the lawyer is an author. But linguistic acts are also social acts, and 
White sees this too. They are social acts not only because language 
itself is social or because the lawyer's linguistic performances take 
place in society, but also because they are performances that create, 
in the text, a social world within which the author relates to his or 
her readers, and vice versa. 
We might ask, at this point, "What are, for White, the specifically 
intellectual and social dimensions of linguistic activity ('acting with 
words')?"27 Intellectually, in creating and re-creating texts with mean-
ing, the author is creating a world. Through this imaginative use of 
his linguistic and cultural materials, the author reconstitutes or re-
makes his own language and culture, thereby offering us, in a sense, 
a remade world (in or through a text). This is an intellectual product; 
a product of the author's intellect. Socially, the experience of reading 
this created text engages the reader with the world of the text and its 
author. Interacting with the text, the reader enters into a community 
of two with the author. The author contributes to constructing this 
community by means of the world that he or she affords us in the 
text, including a position from which to read it and from which to 
respond to it. The reader contributes to constructing this community 
by what he or she does with the opportunities (or disabilities) made 
available by the text and the author. Either reader or author may be 
changed by this experience-or both. Hence, according to White, by 
26. 1. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 5 (1984) [hereinafter 
WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING]. 
27. It may help if I say that, in my reading of White, I understand him to 
be speaking about the social dimension of the use of language when he speaks about 
a "textual community" (see, e.g., id. at 14, 278, 280), and about its intellectual 
dimension when he speaks about a "culture of argument" (see, e.g., id. at 7, 280). 
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way of the use of language, we necessarily become involved in the 
constitution and reconstitution of our character (our selves) and our 
community (our society). (This knowledge of the implications and 
possibilities of our use of language is something that traditional 
jurisprudence does not afford us, and it is an example of what I am 
calling "necessary knowledge." It is necessary knowledge about 
language and, because law is made out of language, about law.) 
To speak in terms of the "reconstitution" or "re-making" of 
materials can convey an impression of revolutionary rebirth, but such 
need not be the case with linguistic action. Rather, in thinking about 
the intellectual and social products generated by such linguistic action, 
we must not over-emphasize their originality or under-emphasize their 
debt to their inheritance. An important part of linguistic activity is 
exactly its revivification of old materials, old thoughts, old words. 
This is a necessary process; otherwise, language decays or deteriorates 
naturally whenever it is not being rejuvenated by creative use. This 
is yet another piece of necessary knowledge revealed by White's 
work. 
In speaking of reconstitution, I do not mean that the writer invents 
a wholly new and idiosyncratic way of talking but that he finds 
ways to give new meaning, and sometimes new form, to the terms, 
structures, and methods of the language he has inherited. He makes 
a 'new language' but not out of nothing; he makes it out of an old 
language, reconstituting its terms of description and feeling, of fact 
and value, into new patterns of significance, new movements of the 
mind. 
Of course words lose their meaning. That is what they have always 
done and will always do. What matters, in the face of this fact, is 
to understand the reconstitutions of language, character, and com-
munity that people have nonetheless managed to achieve in the texts 
they have made with each other and with US. 28 
In speaking here of the writer as someone who "finds ways to give 
new meaning, and sometimes new form, to the terms, structures, and 
methods of the language he has inherited," White is expressing a 
vision of the writer as someone who makes explicit that which is 
implicit in his materials or medium. In my terms, this is a vision of 
the writer as someone who realizes the possibilities of his or her 
inherited medium, making connections imaginatively by exercising his 
or her imagination on materials acquired and possessed through 
inheri tance. 
Given this picture of linguistic action in general, let us apply it 
to someone working within the medium of the law. Consider, for 
28. [d. at 283-284, 290. 
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example, White's description of how a law student might come to 
study and learn the law: 
[T]he way in which law students learn to read cases [is] a way of 
learning about the world in which they will have to live, . . . . On 
his first day in school, the law student is given a case, or set of 
cases, just as they appear in the reports, without further guidance, 
and is asked to reconstruct them from the beginning. His job is to 
live over in his imagination the experience of the parties and of the 
lawyers, asking why this choice or that one was made, what he 
would have done, and how he would have explained himself. He is 
given a piece of the world in which he will one day have to make 
his way, and his task is to figure out what that world is like and 
how to function within it, all on the basis of extremely fragmentary 
evidence. 29 
At this point in White's description of the process of learning the 
activity of being a lawyer, I want to break into his thought to point 
out some of the elements that I find there. 
First, in the part describing the law student's need to reconstruct 
the whole from a fragment, I hear an allusion to Henry James' most 
famous advice to young writers, found in his most famous essay, 
"The Art of Fiction. "30 (White knows this piece of advice and 
reproduces it in The Legal Imagination. 3l ) James, appealing to ex-
perience as a web of possibilities and connections, urges the young 
writer to work on inferring the unseen from the seen, the whole from 
the part. This is, after all, what we do anyway, so we might as well 
practice it explicitly. We can infer on the basis of all the available 
evidence or all of our experience, but neither of these is ever the 
"whole" world that we are trying to get to knowY Instead, we 
29. [d. at 9. 
30. H. JAMES, PARTIAL PORTRAITS 375 (1970) (first published in 1888). 
31. LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra note 22, at 48-49. 
32. This does not mean that there is some other, more "direct" way of 
knowing the "whole" world of which we are capable, but of which we are somehow 
failing to avail ourselves. See S. CAVELL, PURSUITS OF HAPPINESS 75-76 (1981): 
[lIn the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume, through Philo, ... 
had said that 'our experience, so limited in extent and duration, can never 
provide us with a significant conjecture concerning the whole of things.' It 
is as if Kant were saying: This formulation puts our problem wrongly from 
the beginning, it is a false picture of the faculty of knowledge altogether; 
for 'the whole of things' cannot be known by human creatures, not because 
we are limited in the extent of our experience, but, as we might say, because 
we are limited to experience, however extensive. Put it this way: to know 
the world as a whole, or the world as it is in itself, would require us to 
have God's knowledge, to know the world the way we more or less picture 
God to know the world, with every event and all its possibilities directly 
present. And this simultaneous, immediate intuition of the world is not 
merely beyond us in fact or in extent; it is not a matter of having more of 
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always must construct or project that whole world out of the evidence 
and experience we have. And-contrary to Hume's attempt to show 
that any such projection or inference is unwarranted33-Kant took as 
his task the proof that such projection by the imagination was 
necessary, fundamentalY It is a necessary element of our having 
anyt.hing that we could call "experience" (or "knowledge") at all. 
In his vast "architectonic" reconstruction of the human mind 
and human knowledge, its conditions and limits, Kant gives an 
important place to the imagination. It is indispensable to the human 
work of knowing. "[W]e must assume a pure transcendental synthesis 
of imagination as conditioning the very possibility of all experi-
ence. "35 Kant speaks of the imagination as the "synthetic" faculty; 
it is only because of this synthesis, or on condition of this synthesis, 
that we can claim to have "experience" (or knowledge) of anything. 36 
Hence, there is a sense in which Kant's synthesizing faculty of the 
imagination is truly world-creating, for without its activity we could 
not experience anything. Without it, we could not experience so much 
as the world, .or anything within the frame of the world. Henry 
James, in asking the aspiring writer to recognize this fact of our 
existence, of our limitations, and to make the most of it, is simply 
bringing this piece of Kant's transcendental philosophy down to earth. 
I find these allusions to James and Kant instructive because they 
help me to place White's words in context. The context I think of, 
in his description of the law student's learning the law, is that of 
how a person enters a new world, a new form of life, a new activity. 
What White is describing for us is the way in which the law student 
enters into a new world, the new world of the law. To enter it, truly, 
requires that we imagine it, recreate it, project its implications and 
possibilities from the bare facts and words and texts that we have 
before us. These are always "fragmentary" in an absolute sense, but 
need not be in any real or human sense (one, that is, that takes into 
something we now have a little of. It is beyond us in principle; human 
knowledge is not like that. First, because all our knowledge, being a function 
of experience, is sequential; it takes place in time (in history, Hegel will 
say). Second, because the sequences of experience are categorized in definite 
ways-in terms of a definite notion of what an object is, of what a cause 
is-and there is no way to know whether these categories of the understand-
ing are ultimately true of things. All we can say is, they are ours, it is our 
world. 
[d. (emphasis original). 
33. See, e.g., D. HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 
46-53 (C. Hendel ed. 1955) (first published in 1748). 
34. See generally KANT, supra note 14. A useful and non-technical discussion 
of Kant's views on the human imagination can be found in M. WARNOCK, IMAGI-
NATION 26-34 (1976). 
35. KANT, supra note 14, at 133 (A 102). 
36. [d. at 112 (A 78; B 103). 
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account human conditions and limits; what the true possibilities are). 
Here I should say, finally, that White's thrust seems Wittgenstein-
ian through and through (a claim, I take it, that he would not wish 
to deny). Perhaps the best tag for White's project, his imaginative 
reconstruction of the activity of being a lawyer, is Wittgenstein's 
dense epigram, "[T]o imagine a language means to imagine a form 
of life. "37 When Wittgenstein says this, early in the Investigations, 
he is implying, I believe, that to take a language in our minds and 
to ponder its resources, its powers (and pitfalls) of comprehension 
and communication, is to do much more than simply to think about 
words and their meanings or their combinations. It is to remember 
these words as being given human projection and human use, and 
hence entails the imagination of the particular people who use this 
language. These people use the language to do specific things, so yet 
another part of this task of imagining the language is our picturing 
the actions through which and the functions for which these words 
are used and combined. Then, too, Wittgenstein's task asks us to 
imagine the context in which these people, these forms whose lives 
we wish to conceive, use these words to do these things. In other 
words, we are asked to imagine the world in which these life-forms 
reveal or display themselves, namely, reveal themselves to be alive, 
and to show how they inhabit the world they have found habitable, 
the world that they have made for themselves. All these things and 
more we must imagine, in imagining a language, and they are a part 
of what any law student must do if he or she is to enter fully and 
productively into the life of the law. 
Here again is White's description of the law student's progress: 
His primary way of giving attention to a case is by arguing it in his 
head, by examining the resources for making appeals and claims on 
each side that constitute what we call the law. He or she tests each 
statement against other possibilities, wondering why it was not done 
this way or that, asking how things would go if the facts were 
changed in such-and-such a particular, suggesting a puzzle that will 
crack open a particular line of reasoning, proposing an innovation, 
imagining a way to put a point to jury or judge, and so on. 'What 
would I do with this case?' is his constant question, and it is a 
complex one; for it is a way of asking simultaneously about many 
things: about the nature of the resources he is offered by his world; 
about the way in which he and others can put them to use; about 
the facts of a particular case; and about his capacity to imagine or 
to invent new ways of talking that will work in the world he lives 
in.38 
Does this imagine the law student to be a literary aesthete? No, 
nothing like it. Rather, it imagines the law student, as the lawyer, to 
37. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 9, at § 19. 
38. WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 26, at 9. 
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be a worker in words, an author and a reader, and it forces us to 
think about what these truly are. What are they? 
White begins When Words Lose Their Meaning with this sentence: 
"Our life is a life of language, and this book is about what that fact 
has meant, and can mean, to us and to others. "39 This says both 
everything and nothing. It says everything because our life is, first 
and last, a life of and in language. But, left alone, unarticulated or 
unelaborated, this says nothing, because what this fact means to and 
for us, and what it can mean (its implications, its possibilities), are 
left unsaid. White knows this, and his second book is meant to 
elaborate this sentence, working out its significance, making it mean-
ingful. Thus, the action or movement of the book demonstrates 
White's insight that the life of a text (as the life of language) is as 
much in its activity or performance as it is in its message or statement. 
"This book is itself a reconstitution of culture, for in it I have chosen 
certain texts and arranged them in a certain order and have made, I 
hope, something new out of my own inherited materials. It is meant 
to have a shape and life of its own and to work, partly by incorpo-
ration and juxtaposition, not only to say something to its reader but 
to engage him in an activity.' '40 
The activity of writing and the activity of reading are, first, last, 
and always, for White, linguistic activities, a matter of how we make 
our lives and ourselves within the medium of language.41 So writing 
39. Id. at ix. 
40. Id. at 284-285. 
41. Throughout this article, I appeal to a notion of law as a medium, and I 
expect this notion to be problematic. While I am not prepared at this time or in 
this place to offer a full defense of this conception, I do want to offer at least the 
following modest defense. 
In appealing to the notion of a medium in general, I am harkening back to 
something that Stanley Cavell said in characterizing film as a medium of the movies: 
The first successful movies-i.e., the first moving pictures accepted as 
motion pictures-were not applications of a medium that was defined by 
given possibilities, but the creation of a medium by their giving significance 
to specific possibilities. Only the art itself can discover its possibilities, and 
the discovery of a new possibility is the discovery of a new medium. A 
medium is something through which or by means of which something 
specific gets done or said in particular ways. It provides, one might say, 
particular ways to get through to someone, to make sense; in art, they are 
forms, like forms of speech. To discover ways of making sense is always a 
matter of the relation of an artist to his art, each discovering the other. 
S. CAVELL, THE WORLD VIEWED 32 (1971) (emphasis original). Further specifications 
of what Cavell means here by "medium" can be found in S. CAVELL, A Matter of 
Meaning It, in MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 221 (1969), and S. CAVELL, The 
Fact of Television, in THEMES OUT OF SCHOOL 243-244 (1984). 
Any case in the law, or any statute, may create or enforce a medium that we 
accept as "the law," and it does so by giving significance to one or more of the 
specific possibilities that the law has at that time. These possibilities for significance, 
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and reading can always be studied, and always should be studied, in 
terms of what they tell us about the central act of language, that of 
making meaning out of our experience in and of the world in relation 
to others. We approach this problem intellectually by way of the 
following set of questions: How do we make meaning? How do we 
express ourselves? How do we communicate? How do we make 
ourselves, and others, and the world intelligible? These questions are 
a perennial part of literary and philosophical studies, and in such a 
mode or mood we scrutinize how we use and project and withhold 
words, how we make and state and defend claims, how we assert 
and refute and elaborate positions-all the whirl of action and 
intellect that goes into the phenomena that we call "language" and 
"meaning" and "making sense." 
But, as I have said, White also recognizes the social dimensions 
of making meaning in relation to others. Here he emphasizes that 
linguistic activity has social consequences and implications, which 
raise normative questions along lines other than those normative 
issues raised above. 42 
or signification, are not or need not be known a priori, prior to our experience of 
them. See S. CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 119, 121, 123 (1979). Rather, the 
possibility of this particular significance taking place, or taking root, just here just 
now, is a matter of discovery and creation best known to-even if not fully 
understood by-the artist (in law, the professional, the lawyer or judge). Important, 
landmark cases are those cases that manage to capitalize on the legal possibilities 
out of which they are wrought and which in turn they wring or rework, refashion. 
Hard cases, on the other hand-at least, those hard cases that are said to make bad 
law-do not capitalize on their possibilities, their opportunities (perhaps because 
their difficulty distracts us from their possibilities). 
The problem with the tired old conundrum, "Do judges make or find the 
law?", is that it ignores this facet of the law as a medium, and instead imagines the 
law to be a brute fact, either found or made. This presents a false question for 
response, and hence ties our hands. To give significance to the possibilities of the 
law is equally creation and discovery: we create within a medium by discovering 
some of the possibilities for significance of that medium. This means (or suggests 
to me) that this activity of creating and discovering meaning through creative and 
exploratory engagement with the medium of the law-and not just the law, for the 
materials out of which the law is made include materials taken from the world at 
large-may be something else altogether. Thus, there is a problem with characterizing 
the kind of activity through which a judge or lawyer goes in working with the law 
to reach a viable legal solution in terms of either "finding" or "making" law. 
-Still, I want to know why these terms suggest themselves to us with such force in 
this situation. This is an aspect of philosophical therapy that I have not undertaken 
in this article. (I believe that this way of conceiving of law as a medium provides a 
reason for denying Ronald Dworkin's claim that in almost every case, there is one 
correct judgment or decision. See Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.V. L. REv. 
1 (1978).) 
White's conception of law also treats it as a medium of meaning. See, e.g., 
WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 26, at 284. See also Ball, Of Rocks 
and Dams, PVC and Poetry, 36 GA. REV. 7 (1982) reprinted in M. BALL, LYING 
DOWN TOGETHER 21-33 (1985). 
42. White acknowledges his debt to Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, and John R. 
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The texts read here have been drawn from a wide diversity of 
generic types: poetry, history, philosophy, fiction, and law and the 
less easily classifiable texts by Swift, Johnson, and Burke. But we 
have read each of these texts in much the same way, pursuing the 
same questions, drawing analogies and connections between the 
texts, and so on. This has in part been a way of defining our subject 
not as poetry or philosophy or law or any of the others but as the 
general activity of which each of these is a species, namely, the 
cultural and ethical activity of making meaning in relation to 
others.43 
363 
White's basic recognition is that the activity of writing, as the 
activity of reading, as the activity of speaking, is human activity. To 
say this is perhaps only to say that linguistic activities have implica-
tions and consequences and intentions and expectations, just as all 
human activities do. But, as such, linguistic activity is as multi-
dimensional, as full of implication and possibility for meaning and 
significance, as is any other human action or activity.44 What remains 
Searle, in so far as his writing reflects a "conception of language as a kind of social 
action rather than a system of referential tags." WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, 
supra note 26, at 291. 
My reference here to normative questions and issues is meant to prepare the 
way for a recognition, as I argue later, that the activity of being a lawyer engages 
us in a variety of normative realms. The lawyer's use of language invokes the norms 
of language, and these norms need not be either moral or political (although, of 
course, they may be, and may certainly have moral and political implications). 
Another applicable normative realm is the aesthetic, and I believe that this is a more 
important realm for law than is usually recognized. Some few writers on law, 
however, in their emphases on narrative and normativity, do investigate this otherwise 
neglected realm of norms and meaning. In addition to White, see, for example, 
Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983); West, supra 
note 2. 
43. WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 26, at 275. 
44. See S. CAVELL, Must We Mean What We Say?, in MUST WE MEAN WHAT 
WE SAY? 11-12 (1969): 
What needs to be argued now is that something does follow from the fact 
that a term is used in its usual way: it entitles you (or, using the term, you 
entitle others) to make certain inferences, draw certain conclusions. (This 
is part of what you say when you say that you are talking about the logic 
of ordinary language.) Learning what these implications are is part 0/ 
learning the language; no less a part than learning its syntax, or learning 
what it is to which terms apply: they are an essential part of what we 
communicate when we talk. Intimate understanding is understanding which 
is implicit. Nor could everything we say (mean to communicate), in normal 
communication, be said explicitly-otherwise the only threat to communi-
cation would be acoustical. We are, therefore, exactly as responsible for 
the specific implications of our utterances as we are for their explicit factual 
claims. And there can no more be some general procedure for securing that 
what one implies is appropriate than there can be for determining that what 
one says is true. Misnaming and misdescribing are not the only mistakes 
we can make in talking. Nor is lying its only immorality. 
[d. (emphasis original). 
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to be seen is the extent to which we prove capable of realizing the 
meaning that linguistic activity has-especially in the law. (Realizing 
it both in the sense of awakening to it and in the sense of actualizing 
it.) 
From this conception of the shared activity of lawyers making 
meaning with others-by acting with words-White derives a new 
vision of the law, as itself an intellectual and social discipline built 
upon the intellectual and social dimensions of linguistic activity. This 
activity, characterized primarily in terms of the constitution and 
reconstitution of language, character, and community, White finds 
exemplified in the activity of being a lawyer. 
The law is a set of social and intellectual practices that have their 
own reality, force, and significance. It provides a place that is at 
once part of the larger culture and apart from it, a place in which 
we can think about a problematic story by retelling it in various 
ways and can ask in a new and self-conscious way what it is to 
mean. Law works by a process of argument that places one version 
of events against another and creates a tension between them (and 
between the endings appropriate to each); in doing so it makes our 
choice of language conscious rather than habitual and creates a 
moment at which controlled change of language and culture becomes 
possible. The rhetorical structure of the law makes a place for each 
party and defines a relation between them by establishing the ways 
they may talk; in doing this it suggests a conception of justice as 
equality, for a person may find himself in any of these roles. The 
method of criticism most appropriate to the law as such is concerned 
less with the wisdom of a particular policy choice or the rightness 
of a particular rule or result than with the character that a court, 
legislature, or other legal speaker gives himself and his institution, 
the place it defines for others, and the relation it establishes between 
them. The law is less a branch of the social sciences than of the 
humanities in that it seeks not to be a closed system but an open 
one. It learns from the past and seeks new terms for the expression 
of motives, new forms for the establishment of relations; it is a 
method of learning and teaching; and its central concern is with the 
kind of relations that we establish with our inherited culture and 
with each other when we speak its language. 4s 
Immediately after this summation of his vision of law, White makes 
clear how he sees his conception of law in relation to many of our 
current practices of law. He says: 
This account of the law is of course not a description of the way 
every lawyer and judge in fact goes to work or how he conceives 
of himself, nor is it meant to justify the actual operation and effect 
of our legal system, let alone our economic system, both of which 
45. WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 26, at 273. See also id. 
at 313-314 n. 41. 
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in fact suffer from disgraceful injustices. Rather, I mean to suggest 
a set of possibilities implicit in the institution and its practices, to 
define the kind of aim that the lawyer can have for himself.46 
IV. TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS OBJECT 
365 
White's vision connects the law with people by way of their use 
of the linguistic and cultural resources of law. In making this 0 
connection by way of the activities that generate meaning and signif-
icance in our legal culture, the world of law is conceived of as a set 
of intellectual and social practices within the map of human activity. 
Writers in traditional jurisprudence have made very different 
connections with the law, seeing very different possibilities in the 
law. These writers take law to be something independent of us, a 
kind of object that we meet in the world. Let me take H.L.A. Hart 
as a prominent example representing this traditional understanding 
of law. 
Hart characterizes law as a system of rules. His scheme is as 
follows: Law is an integrated system of what he calls "primary" 
rules (Le., duty-imposing rules) and "secondary" rules (Le., power-
conferring rules), which system is based upon a single fundamental 
rule called "the Rule of Recognition"; this fundamental or "master" 
rule comprises the criteria of law. To the extent that we accept the 
criteria enunciated in or implied by this Rule, it authorizes the 
enactment or declaration of legal rules by certain officials. It is the 
intersection of such enacted primary and secondary rules, presuppos-
ing this "master" rule and its criteria, that marks the emergence of 
a modern domestic legal system.47 
This description of Hart's vision is too spare to convey any of 
its depth and intricacy, but my hope is that the elements of Hart's 
legal philosophy are sufficiently well-known and well-settled as to 
permit such a gesture. Besides, I am less interested here in exploring 
the details of Hart's vision than I am in studying one of its general 
features, which is this: What exactly is Hart's vision a vision of? 
That is, what kind of a phenomenon does Hart's vision make out of 
the law? 
Hart's vision of law, as is typical of the tradition, directs our 
attention toward an object of some kind (Le., a system of rules). 
Much of traditional jurisprudence then becomes an attempt to de-
scribe ever more clearly and ever more accurately this particular 
object-here, the constitutive elements (Le., the rules) of a legal 
system and their intricate relations and operations within this system. 
46. Id. at 273-274. 
47. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 48,78-79,91-95,97-100, 107, 111-
114 (1961). 
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This perspective on law implicitly commits us to certain specific 
models, not only of law but also of reality, knowledge, and language 
(in the tradition of Descartes, Bacon, and Hobbes), all of which go 
unnoticed and unquestioned in traditional jurisprudence. Specifically, 
we are invited to adopt the attitude of the scientist toward law, which 
commits us to a scientist's vision of the world and our ways of 
knowing and categorizing it. (At one point, Hart describes himself 
as being engaged in a task of "descriptive sociology. "48) In addition, 
we are invited to speak in certain ways about law (e.g., in verifiable 
or testable propositions), as though other ways of speaking do not 
comport with the nature of law. 
This traditional vision of law divorces us from the law in the 
sense that it makes law an independent object of our world, thereby 
assuming a distance between us and the law, and assuming a partic-
ular model or form of knowledge that we possess with respect to 
law. This metaphysical and epistemological distance is similar to the 
distance that exists between us and a material or physical object (e.g., 
a tree or a tomato, a rock or a river). Traditional jurisprudence 
assumes this distance in so far as it assumes that law is there to be 
found, out there in the world, just as a book of rules or a series of 
statutes is out there. Accordingly, we are put into a relation with the 
law that mimics our relation with material or physical objects. Law 
is this thing, out there, that exists separate from us and that we can 
study or scrutinize at our pleasure. 
But this is not right. Here I might appeal to Lon Fuller, who 
also voices dissatisfaction with the way in which this vision of law 
relates us to the law. Fuller says that Hart "treat[s] law as a datum 
projecting itself into human experience and not as an object of 
human striving. "49 Fuller goes on, in The Morality oj Law, to claim 
that "[i]t is truly astounding to what an extent there runs through 
modern thinking in legal philosophy the assumption that law is like 
a piece of inert matter-it is there or not there. "50 I think I know 
what Fuller means. 
Traditional jurisprudence treats law as an independently existing 
object, a physical (or metaphysical) object that exists out there in the 
world, simply and cleanly unconnected with humans or human efforts 
and actions, until human beings put themselves into relation with it 
by choice. One of the problems with this view is that it misconceives 
our relations with objects (physical or otherwise), as though our 
relations with the world (physical or otherwise) were more simple and 
less problematic than they truly are. But, more to my immediate 
point, this traditional view draws the wrong analogy for law. Law is 
48. [d. at vii. 
49. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 646 (1959). 
50. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 123 (1964). 
HeinOnline -- 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 367 1986-1987
1987] ACTIVITY OF BEING A LA WYER 367 
not a physical object; it is a human art or activity. Without being 
able to explain fully what the relevant similarities and differences are 
between physical objects and human arts and activities, I believe one 
possible way of differentiating them is by paying attention to the 
differences in their modes of origin. 
Physical objects result from natural or causal processes in which 
humans need have no hand. Physical objects come into and pass out 
of this world unbidden by human beings, or unaided and unabetted 
by human beings. (Of course, people can plant acorns, from which 
the mighty oak will grow; and we can destroy all manner of physical 
objects. But a rock or river usually comes into existence without the 
intervention of human agency or intentions, although on occasion we 
construct an artificial river.) 
Art and activities, on the other hand, "emerge naively, like games 
[we] invent for [our]selves" (Oakeshott). Products of these arts and 
activities-e.g., legal rules-are human artifacts, which come into 
existence only through the will and effort of human beings. Once in 
the world, it is true that these products or artifacts have a side to 
their existence much like that of physical objects, since they too use 
physical materials. Yet they are generated not by nature or causal 
laws, but by human artistry and action. Also, once generated, arti-
facts have another dimension to their existence that is unusual (if not 
unknown) for physical objects: they are attended to with an interest 
and excitement and absorption generally unknown to natural ob-
jects.51 It is one of the purposes of artifacts, one of their functions, 
to serve in this capacity. They are made to absorb, excite, interest 
us. Their reason for being is their claim to fulfill this function in our 
lives, and their ability to do so establishes their right to be called 
"art. "52 
So artifacts generally depend upon humans for their existence 
and for their continued treatment as artifacts. Legal texts, I am 
claiming, share this status with artifacts along at least two dimensions. 
First, both artifacts and legal texts (including rules) are utterances; 
they communicate with us by speaking to us. While physical objects 
may communicate something to us, while they may mean something 
to us (e.g., "Those clouds mean rain"), they do so not by speaking 
to us or uttering anything at all. Rather, we read or interpret them 
as physical signs, parts of a natural or physical process (e.g., causa-
tion). Artifacts and legal texts (as such) are not parts of a natural or 
51. There are, of course, some exceptions or limitations to this generalization, 
such as parks and gardens. Also, I recognize that some people-e.g., geologists, 
botanists, and even nature lovers-lavish similar attention on physical objects. These 
exceptions do not blunt the point of my generalization. 
52. See S. CAVELL, Music Discomposed, in MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 
197-198 (1969); see also S. CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 119 (1979). 
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physical process, but rather are parts of an intentional process. 53 
They are intended, meant, to communicate something to their audi-
ence. 
This fact concerning artifacts and texts as utterances suggests the 
second aspect that distinguishes artifacts and legal texts from physical 
objects: they are intentional objects. Their function of communicating 
something to an audience-which they fulfill by their utterance-is 
intended, and is the reason for their being (both the reason for their 
being at all, and the reason for their being as they are). Stanley 
Cavell describes this intentional dimension of artifacts as follows: 
[T]he picture of a poem as more or less like a physical object [is 
false], whereas the first fact of works of art is that they are meant, 
meant to be understood. A poem, whatever else it is, is an utterance 
(outer-ance). It is as true to say of poems that they are physical 
objects as to say of human actions that they are physical motions 
(though it is perfectly true that there would not be an action unless 
somebody moved, did something) .... So let me simply claim that 
apart from the recognition that one's subject, in art, is the inten-
tionality of objects, one will appeal, in speaking of these objects, 
to sources of organization . . . in ways which fail to tell why this 
thing is as it is, how it means what it doesY 
While it is perfectly true to say that without the physical or material 
medium that is the basis out of which any artifact or legal text is 
made, there could be no such artifact or text, this does not mean 
that therefore the artifact or text just is a physical or material object. 
I want these remarks to suggest that the tendency in traditional 
jurisprudence to treat law as though it were a physical object, 
independent of us, is misleading and holds dangers for misunder-
standing. This way of relating us to law relies upon the reification 
of law, and while this process of reification is very natural to us, I 
think that we must resist it here. For law, on my understanding, is 
not an independent entity, not a system of rules separable from the 
humans who have made them or from the conditions under which 
these rules are made, used, and remade or removed. On my view, 
law is an art or activity, a human form of life. To understand law 
is to understand an aspect of human life, one way in which humans 
live (and die), one way that the human being finds to form and 
53. On the notions of utterances and meaning within an intentional process, 
see Grice, Meaning, 66 PHIL. REv. 377 (1957); Grice, Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-
Meaning and Word Meaning, 4 FOUND. OF LANGUAGE 225 (1968); Grice, Utterer's 
Meaning and Intentions, 78 PHIL. REv. 147 (1969); Grice, Logic and Conversation, 
in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 41 (P. Cole & 1.L. Morgan eds. 1975); Grice, Further 
Notes on Logic and Conversation, in 9 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 113 (P. Cole ed. 
1978). 
54. S. CAVELL, A Matter oj Meaning It, in MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 
227-228 (1969). 
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embody and express its life on this earth. On this view of law, 
jurisprudence becomes a form of self-understanding, an inquiry into 
what we do and become when we live in or through the law, or what 
we fail to do and become when we live outside the law. Hence, to 
break the relation of law to the humans who find and make and 
argue about and otherwise work with it, is not an analytic expedient, 
but an analytic preventive; it hurts rather than helps the process of 
analyzing the phenomena of law. 
V. TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS RULES 
For something .clear and observable, you may say, I have substi-
tuted something obscure and ephemeral. Perhaps. But the latter 
conception may prove to be more true to our experience and knowl-
edge of law, and more fruitful for our inquiries and investigations. 
In particular, it is a mistake to think that law as a system of rules is 
something "clear and observable," whereas law as an artistic activity 
is something "obscure and ephemeral." This contrast of faith in the 
clarity of one conception of law (as a system of rules) and lack of 
faith in an alternative conception (as artistic activity) reveals one of 
the unquestioned assumptions that bolster traditional jurisprudence. 
Given our confidence in our knowledge of rules, and our lack of 
confidence in our knowledge of activities, the apparent clarity and 
certainty both promised and produced by the traditional model of 
law as a system of rules are understandable. 
One reason for this contrast in confidence is that we think we 
know what a rule is, and we arc not so sure that we know what an 
(artistic, or any) activity is. We can fairly easily give examples of 
rules and can state rules, and they often are sufficiently compact and 
comprehensible as not to disturb our confidence in our ability to 
construct an adequate jurisprudential theory out of them. Not so 
with our sense of an activity. First, there is the awful ambiguity of 
what an activity is, the sheer amorphousness of trying to say what 
an activity is, or even to describe an activity. White understands this 
problem: 
The first step in working out a way of talking about both reading 
and writing, for me at least, is to recognize that these, like other 
human activities-such as dancing, quarreling, playing football, 
telling a story, even sleeping-are not susceptible to complete re-
duction to descriptive or analytic terms. Each of these activities 
engages parts of the self that do not function in explicitly verbal 
ways, and behind all of our attempts to describe or direct them 
remains an experience that is by its nature inexpressible .... Action 
of this kind can never be wholly explained, and our talk about these 
things should reflect that fact. ss 
55. WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 26, at 5-6. 
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We may be able to give examples of activities, but usually we find it 
difficult to say exactly where the activity begins and where it ends. 
This ineffability does not seem to apply to rules, which by contrast 
seem explicit and circumscribed. 
I want to pursue further this picture of the relative determinacy 
and circumscription of rules in a legal system. To speak in terms of 
law as a system of rules is naturally enough to bring to mind a grid 
or network of rules, a kind of code. Here it is easy to conjure up 
the simple image of a booklet containing a set of rules. And some-
times we think of law in this way, as though the law could be 
identified with a law library, stacks and stacks of books that compose 
the law. (They compose the medium of the law and a part of its 
message, but not, by any means, the whole of its message, nor the 
whole of its activity or performance.) 
This is a vision of law as an established code of rules, as though 
our activity with law consists solely in reading our actions off the 
prescriptions and prohibitions of legal rules. But there are at least 
three problems with this vision of law. First, this imagines law to 
speak with far less ambiguity or equivocation and far more complete-
ness than it in fact does. Second, it equates law and legal activity 
with a simplistic model of games and game-playing. Third, at best, 
it understands the law in terms of atomistic or discrete actions, not 
as an integrated activity involving attitudes, practices, and institutions 
(i.e., ways of life). I shall deal very briefly with the first two 
complaints and more extensively with the third. 
(l) Rules of law speak not unambiguously or unequivocally, but 
generally and broadly. They cover a range of possible cases, and thus 
require that we work with them in applying them to any specific case 
or controversy in order to find or fashion a resolution that is legally 
acceptable. In the light of Mr. Justice Holmes' recognition that 
"[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases, "56 we are en-
couraged to see the law as a medium that must be coaxed and worked 
with-its implications and possibilities imagined and realized-before 
it yields an answer or resolution that both it and we can recognize 
and accept. This work is part of the activity of law. 
(2) In so far as the rules of a game can be said to define and set 
forth the moves of the game and can be stated in a booklet, then to 
think of law as comprising a vast booklet setting forth the rules that 
define moves required, permitted, or prohibited in the law is to think 
of law as a game. The traditional vision of law as a system of rules 
seems to imagine law in this way. (Hart repeatedly invokes an analogy 
between law and playing a gameY) Our legal actions, then, are moves 
in a game defined and controlled by legal rules, and the playing of 
56. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
57. HART, supra note 47, at 9, 34,40,55-56, 136-141. 
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the law-game is defined and circumscribed by its rules. But there are 
good and sufficient reasons for denying this view that either human 
activity or human game-playing is essentially rule-governed or rule-
circumscribed. 58 Life and law are more creative and unpredictable 
than this view imagines. 
(3) The vision of law as a code raises yet a third problem. It 
suggests that all law can be seen or understood on the model of a 
written constitution or that of statutory codifications. This suggestion 
is untrue; but, even if it were true, its attraction would depend upon 
a mechanistic conception of written constitutions and statutory codes. 
We need to ask: How do constitutions and statutes work? 
Both types of document declare rules of law, among other things, 
and upon some of these rules reasonably discrete acts can be based. 
But this declaratory function is actually very little of the life that 
these types of document have. As White has pointed out, a much 
larger part of their existence goes toward creating and sustaining a 
rhetorical community in which we find or place ourselves, and with 
which we work in remaking our community and ourselves. In this 
sense, the United States Constitution is a rhetorical document in 
which topics of conversation and debate and argument are located 
and defined, where various voices and roles are given to various 
speakers, and various occasions for speech or for silence are estab-
lished and defined, and so forth. To say that law is merely a system 
of rules is to misidentify some of the elements used in the rhetoric 
of the law for the whole of law. Law also includes the rhetorical 
activity by means of which those elements are used and further 
elaborated. As White says: 
What [the Constitution and statutes] actually do is alter the rhetor-
ical conditions of life for those in whose name they are promulgated 
and those to whom they speak .... [T]he very existence of such a 
text as [the Constitution] makes available certain kinds of claim and 
appeal, certain kinds of movement and action, that would otherwise 
be impossible .... At its most successful, an instrument like this 
can be said to establish the fundamental terms of new kinds of 
conversation; for it creates a set of speakers, defines the occasions 
for and topics of their speech, and is itself a text that may be 
referred to as authoritative .... The Constitution works by creating 
the occasions and warrants for making a certain set of claims, and 
in this respect it is like the other constitutions we are always making 
in our own lives, in the form of contracts and agreements, block-
betterment associations, and so on.59 
58. See, e.g., S. CAVELL, Must We Mean What We Say?, and The Availability 
oj Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy. in MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 21-31. 47-
52 (1969); S. CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 119-121, 294-297, 303-309, 311-312 
(1979). 
59. WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 26, at 245. 
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These documents, be they Constitution or statutes, are rhetorical 
documents that set the terms and occasions of our legal conversations, 
perhaps, but they do not dictate what we must say in these terms or 
on these occasions. And what we say with them-what we do with 
them-is a part of law: it is part of the activity of law. 
The activity of law comes from our being embedded in the 
medium of law and made or invited or provoked to do something 
with it. What I mean by this can be illustrated by looking again at 
Michael Oakeshott's Inaugural Lecture: 
The politics of a community are not less individual (and not more 
so) than its language, and they are learned and practised in the 
same manner. We do not begin to learn our native language by 
learning words, but words in use;. we do not begin (as we begin in 
reading) with what is easy and go on to what is more difficult; we 
do not begin at school, but in the cradle; and what we say springs 
always from our manner of speaking.60 
Oakeshott's idea is that speech is holistic, as are our other activities. 
The utterance or projection of a word, the making of an argument, 
the entering of a claim-these speech acts are integrated parts of a 
larger whole, a manner of speaking, a language, and their character 
and content proceed from that whole; they are a function of the 
place that these parts have in this whole. 61 If to learn a language is 
to learn a form of life, as Wittgenstein implies,62 which Oakeshott 
calls a "manner of speaking," then the law that we generate proceeds 
not simply from legal rules but from the whole of the medium of 
law itself. This medium of law includes not only rules but also 
concepts, language, attitudes, expectations, practices, and institutions. 
Let me return, then, to the model of law as a code. Legal 
materials less formed and formal than constitutions and statutes draw 
us even farther away from this traditional model of law and its 
associated asumptions. Think about that vast body of materials and 
activity known as the common law. Or, think about the British 
notion of an unwritten constitution. Or, think about customary law, 
international law, and many other fields of law. These fields of law 
(not largely dependent upon statutes) are not properly described as 
codes or codifications. 
A.W.B. Simpson has argued persuasively that the traditional 
conception of law as a code does not comport with our experience 
of the Anglo-American legal tradition. 63 (As with Soper, I read 
60. OAKESHOTT, supra note 11, at 129. 
61. The holistic vision of language suggested by Oakeshott is most powerfully 
expressed, I believe, in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. See Eisele, supra note 17. 
See also Oakeshott's remark at text accompanying note 20 supra. 
62. See text accompanying note 37 supra. 
63. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE (2d Series) 77 (A.W.B. Simpson ed. 1973). 
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Simpson's criticism to be an indictment of the failure of imagination 
shown by traditional jurisprudence. Given our knowledge and expe-
rience of the Anglo-American common law, Simpson is saying, we 
cannot imaginatively grasp it as a mere set of rules, no matter how 
diverse or interconnected.} 
According to Simpson, the traditional conception portrays all law 
as though it were statutory in origin and in form. But of course it is 
not. 64 One of the most significant omissions in such a conception of 
law, Simpson says, is its inability to characterize or to account for 
Anglo-American common law. The common law is nothing like a 
code or codification, nothing like statutory law in origin or form. 
Simpson claims that the common law is better seen as a kind of 
customary law, one that exists as a body of traditional ideas received 
within a caste of experts or professionals.65 
In Simpson's study of the common law, he attempts to answer 
two questions: "Can the common law be said to exist at all? If so, 
in what sense can it be said to exist?"66 These questions express a 
skepticism about traditional jurisprudence that I share, because the 
questions suggest that it is difficult to characterize the common law. 
This is a difficulty that is not recognized in the speech of traditional 
jurisprudence, which characteristically speaks of the common law as 
though it were a body of rules. Simpson is challenging just this 
picture of the common law, and by doing so he is challenging 
traditional jurisprudence on a level deeply akin to my own challenge, 
namely, on the level at which traditional jurisprudence attempts to 
reify or objectify law as a kind of independently existing (physical 
or metaphysical) object. Since traditional jurisprudence seems to 
assume that law is an object qua a system of rules, it sees little 
problem in its characterization of law. But, for anyone for whom 
the characterization of law is a problem (such as Simpson or myself), 
how one speaks about law is a criterion of what one thinks law is. 
Simpson pursues his dissatisfaction with traditional jurisprudence 
by asking what sense general statements of law, general propositions 
or rules of law, have. He wants to know, What makes such utterances 
true or false? Are they true or false?67 He concludes that we cannot 
64. [d. at 82. 
65. [d. at 80, 94. It seems to me that this valuable reconception is applicable 
to more than the common law alone. That aspect of law spoken about in the 
writings of natural law theorists, for example, can be so understood. On this 
alternative view, natural law is not a set of rules or norms or maxims competing 
with a set of posited rules, but rather is a congeries of concepts and categories 
necessary to law and out of which we generate our posited and non-posited rules. I 
am currently working on a paper in which I develop this alternative view of natural 
law and some of its consequences. 
66. [d. at 78. 
67. !d. at 78-79. 
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verify them by checking their correspondence with identifiable ele-
ments (such as rules) that somehow exist independently as objects in 
the world. This means that, metaphysically and epistemologically, 
the common law is not divisible in any satisfactory way into rules or 
propositions of law. Instead, it can be thought of as a medium of 
traditional ideas, concepts, and expressions extending over many years 
or even centuries, out of which judges and lawyers generate rules 
and propositions of law that are, for the time being, accepted (or 
rejected).68 The activity of generating these rules and propositions is 
not a "positing" of them or a "laying down" of them, contrary to 
the claims of legal positivism. Rather, this activity is a matter of 
making warranted, acceptable uses of shared legal (and non-legal) 
materials. 69 Thus, for example, the creation of precedent is not 
understood by Simpson as being identical with judicial legislation ,70 
again, contrary to the claims of traditional jurisprudence. 
Simpson's view is holistic, akin to White's and Oakeshott's. 
Simpson argues that some developments in law are supported by 
appeal to "non-legal" ideas or concepts. 71 Hence, law takes place as 
an activity of meaning and significance within a broader conceptual 
(and normative) context. This "whole" gives law some of the signif-
icance that it has. And, rather than the rationality of the law 
depending solely upon the logical manipulation of legal rules, Simp-
son argues that the rationality of legal rules depends upon the whole 
body of materials that compose the common law. In a sense, then, 
the common law is a kind of language.72 Rules of law clearly are one 
aspect of the materials of law, but they by no means exhaust those 
materials. And, to understand the rationality, the meaning, and the 
normative force of such rules, we must understand both the ideas or 
concepts from which they are generated and the processes or activities 
by which they are generated. 73 
Simpson's conception of law is one in which the emphasis is 
placed squarely on the conceptual and performative elements of law 
from which warranted statements of law come. Accordingly, since 
his emphasis is not on the finished or formalized entities of law-the 
rules or, more generally, "norms"-but rather is on the materials 
(traditional ideas) out of which those entities are made, and on the 
makers (caste of experts) of those entities, I think of Simpson's vision 
of law as being a vision of law as an artistic activity. 
68. /d. at 85-86. 
69. [d. 
70. [d. 
71. [d. at 87. 
72. [d. at 89. 
73. [d. at 94. 
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VI. TRADITIONAL JURISPRUDENCE: ITS QUESTIONS 
I have tried to suggest certain ways in which the vision of law 
offered us by traditional jurisprudence puts us into the wrong rela-
tionship with law, making the wrong connections between us and 
law. I have said that law is neither a physical object nor a meta-
physical object (e.g., a system of rules). Instead, I have drawn upon 
the work of James Boyd White and others to show that we are 
related to law in ways different from the relations and connections 
suggested by the tradition. Then why, we may ask, can we become 
captivated by the vision offered us by traditional jurisprudence? 
Part of the attraction of such a tradition is its promise (and 
production) of relatively simple and straightforward answers to three 
central problems in jurisprudence. If one believes these problems to 
be both essential to and inescapable for any adequate theory of law, 
then one may continue to feel, despite certain misgivings, that this is 
the best available approach to law that we have. 
The three problems for any theory of law are the following. First, 
and most general, if we are to answer the global question of juris-
prudence-"What is law?"-we must be able to identify law. The 
conception of law as a physical object gives us a model for how to 
identify law-what we should look for, what we should expect, the 
normal ways we have of identifying a physical object, and so forth. 
The companion conception of law as a system of rules promises us 
both that we can identify the law and that we can identify specific 
laws-the former is a system of rules, and the latter are the particular 
rules within the system. 
Second, once we have identified law, we want to know why what 
we have identified as law is law. That is, we want to know why it 
has the status or identity of law. This I take to be the question that 
traditional jurisprudence asks, obsessively, in terms of, "What is the 
nature of legal validity?", or, "What makes law(s) valid?" This 
really means, or asks, "What makes law law?" 
Third, once we have gotten this far, we are in a position to ask 
the; question, "What difference does the validity of law make?" In 
one form, this question is translated into the question, "What is the 
nature of legal obligation?" or, "Do valid laws obligate us, prima 
facie or otherwise?" In another form, this question is transformed 
into the perennial jurisprudential question, "What is the relation or 
connection, if any, between law and morality?" This question relates 
to the validity of law because it asks, "Can moral considerations or 
concerns invalidate a law that otherwise is or would be valid?" These 
questions about law and morality seem worth asking only at this 
point in a theory of law, because it is only after we can identify law 
(say what is law) and only after we can say what makes law valid 
(say what makes law law), that we seem to be in a position to say 
whether or not morality plays any part either in the phenomena we 
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identify as law or in the conditions and elements that make law valid. 
The traditional conception of law as an independent object, 
physical or metaphysical, promises and produces answers to all of 
these questions, and does so in a way that we are apt to find 
satisfying. Hart answers the first question-"What is law?"-by 
saying that it is, essentially, the union or integration of primary and 
secondary rules in a. system of rules, presupposing the Rule of 
Recognition and its criteria. His answer to the second question-
"What makes law valid?"-is that the authorization of these rules 
by the criteria of the Rule of Recognition, initially or ultimately, is 
the basis of their validity. Third, he says that legal validity is not 
affected by the moral status of a rule, since there is no necessary or 
conceptual connection between law and morality (except for the core 
of good sense that Hart acknowledges in the natural law tradition). 
It is not clear to me that the alternative vision of law that I have 
been sketching fares better in answering these perennial questions of 
traditional jurisprudence. To the first question, "What is law?", the 
response is that law is a set of intellectual and social practices, an 
activity engaged in by lawyers and laymen in their joint and several 
attempts to make meaning out of the materials of law. Perhaps this 
response is more just or more encompassing than is the response of 
traditional jurisprudence. But it runs the risk of being too encom-
passing, and too amorphous. In particular, how are we to distinguish 
law from other activities of meaning-making? By the nature of the 
texts or materials used? But then we may ask, What makes those 
texts or materials specifically legal? 
This leads directly into the second question, "What makes law 
law?" Here too the answer is not obvious from the perspective of 
the alternative position that I have been sketching. In one guise, this 
question suggests the questions, "What makes law legitimate?" and 
"What gives law authority?" To such questions, this alternative 
position does have something of an answer, because I understand it 
to see the authority of law to be a matter of the ways in which we 
generate law, or modify or repeal it. These means of creating law 
are equally means of creating the authority of law. In other words, 
these means of creation are a part of what makes law authoritative. 
This replaces a positivistic concept of authority-whereby the au-
thority of law is derived from the position of the one positing it-
with a concept of authority that has both participatory and meth-
odological dimensions-whereby the authority of law is derived from 
the methods by which it is generated, in concert with a consideration 
of the people who participate in making the law. (This conception 
of authority is not original with me. 74) 
74. See J. VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN 146-147, 
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The third question, concerning the obligatoriness of law and the 
relation between law and morality, seems equally difficult to answer 
from the alternative perspective sketched here. The beginning of a 
response might be made from White's insight that law, being a matter 
of human activity, with social as well as intellectual dimensions, is 
as essentially a matter of ethics (and politics and rhetoric and 
poetics75) as it is a matter of anything else. From such a start, one 
might close the gap between law and morality opened by the tradi-
tional, positivistic vision of law (and morality). 
The more fundamental point may be, however, that the alternative 
position does not have direct responses to this battery of questions 
from traditional jurisprudence. This would show not the irrelevance 
of this alternative position, but rather its identity. It is a separate 
vision of the law, one not spawned from within the tradition. Hence, 
its questions as well as its answers will be different, for its entire 
conception of law is different. Its difference from traditional juris-
prudence means that it will ask different questions of law and perhaps 
look in different quarters for the answers to its questions. It will find 
questions to be important and interesting that are unimportant and 
uninteresting to the tradition. Just this fact about this alternative 
conception shows it to be both philosophical and revolutionary. 76 
VII. OUR RELATIONS WITH RULES 
One of the great virtues of White's approach to law is that he 
attempts to place us in relation with law, to see and reveal our 
connections with law. By placing us in the picture that he paints of 
law, by seeing law as a human activity, White makes room for 
humans in a way that traditional jurisprudence does not. (I suggest 
that this is one reason for the lack of vitality in traditional juris-
prudence, as identified earlier by Soper. 77) 
155-156, 179-186 (1986). See also WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 
26, at 198, 270-271; Law as Language, supra note 25, at 434; B. BARBER, STRONG 
DEMOCRACY 183 (1984); P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); D. Wueste, The 
Authority of Law and the Integrity of Legal Processes (1985) (unpublished doctoral 
dissertation, Department of Philosophy, Washington University). 
75. White's four favorite Aristotelian terms for investigating our actions with 
words-ethics, 'politics, rhetoric, and poetics-are evidence for the claim that White's 
chief concern is with our use of language as a human activity. In each of the treatises 
of the same names as above, Aristotle is concerned with describing and analyzing a 
specific dimension of human activity, and understanding its logic. In this sense, the 
Oakeshottian task of mapping human actions is quite traditional, indeed, but only 
recently has it been revived in twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy. 
76. See S. CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 121 (1979); S. CAVELL, THE SENSES 
OF Walden 129-130 (exp. ed. 1981). 
77 . See SOPER, supra note 5, at 1. 
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Traditional jurisprudence, on the other hand, treats law as an 
independent object, physical or metaphysical, from which we are 
divorced or separated. It does this even in so far as it pictures law 
as a system of rules, because it pays insufficient attention to our 
knowledge and use of rules. In so doing, it fails to account accurately 
for the implications and possibilities that inhere in our relations with 
rules. I now want to examine this divorce more fully in the specific 
context of how we do in fact relate to rules, including legal rules. 
My allegation may seem surprising, and unfair, especially in the 
light of the achievement of H.L.A. Hart, who more than any other 
modern philosopher of law has lavished attention upon the idea that 
law is a matter of rules. Hart argues that rules are essential to a legal 
system; without "the idea of a rule," he says, "we cannot hope to 
elucidate even the most elementary forms of law. "78 In particular, it 
is the union or integration of primary and secondary rules that 
provides the key to the study and understanding of law: "[W]e shall 
make the general claim that in the combination of these two types 
of rule there lies what Austin wrongly claimed to have found in the 
notion of coercive orders, namely, 'the key to the science of juris-
prudence.' ... We accord this union of elements a central place 
because of their explanatory power in elucidating the concepts that 
constitute the framework of legal thought. "79 
Chief among the legal concepts elucidated by this union of rules 
is that of obligation. For Hart, as for traditional jurisprudence 
generally, it is a problem to explain how law obligates us. We want 
to explain how law is something more than state coercion, state 
orders backed by threats of state force. It is primarily for its 
clarification of the ob!igatoriness of law-and, thus, in general, of 
the normativity of law-that Hart concentrates on "the idea of a 
rule" in his analysis of the concept of law. 
This concentration leads him to emphasize that a legal system is 
paradigmatically the union or combination of primary and secondary 
rules, a fact that he thinks elucidates not only legal but also political 
concepts. Hart notes: 
If we stand back and consider the structure which has resulted from 
the combination of primary rules of obligation with the secondary 
rules of recognition, change and adjudication, it is plain that we 
have here not only the heart of a legal system, but a most powerful 
tool for the analysis of much that has puzzled both the jurist and 
the political theorist. 
Not only are the specifically legal concepts with which the lawyer is 
professionally concerned, such as those of obligation and rights, 
78. HART, supra note 47, at 78. 
79. Id. at 79. 
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validity and source of law, legislation and jurisdiction, and sanction, 
best elucidated in terms of this combination of elements. The 
concepts (which bestride both law and political theory) of the state, 
of authority, and of an official require a similar analysis if the 
obscurity which still lingers about them is to be dissipated. The 
reason why an analysis in these terms of primary and secondary 
rules has this explanatory power is not far to seek. Most of the 
obscurities and distortions surrounding legal and political concepts 
arise from the fact that these essentially involve reference to what 
we have called the internal point of view: the view of those who do 
not merely record and predict behaviour conforming to rules, but 
use the rules as standards for the appraisal of their own and others' 
behaviour.80 
379 
I agree with Hart that we must account for law's normativity if 
we are to differentiate law from mere force or power (his "gunman 
situation writ large"SI). But I do not agree that the idea of a rule, 
nor even the idea of the union or integration of different types of 
rule, gives us sufficient materials from which to construct such an 
account. Instead, I believe that the additional elements needed for a 
vision of law adequate to its normative dimensions come only if we 
appreciate law's connection with the humans who create (and destroy) 
it, and its connection with· the activities and contexts that give it both 
life and direction. 
Legal rules cannot be understood in a vacuum, and they do not 
in themselves form a "system" that bears life or activity. (This truth 
is acknowledged in law school courses concerned with "The Legal 
Process" or "Legal Reasoning," since their aim is to describe the 
contexts in which legal rules operate.) Legal rules alone, outside of 
their contexts, can be unintelligible. What we further require is an 
understanding of the processes that generate them, the activities in 
which they are applied and to which they are applied, the forms of 
life in which rules have their point or purpose, and so forth. To 
isolate rules as the only important aspect of law, or as the sole 
significant constituent of law, is to ignore exactly the contextual 
elements of law that give rules point and meaning (i.e., their signif-
icance and importance), and hence their normativity (one aspect of 
which is their obligatoriness). 
These are many assertions that I have made about rules in the 
law, and my readers have a right to know on what I base them. 
These are lessons I have learned about rules and the law in part from 
my own experience in the practice and teaching of law, but also in 
part from others. 
For example, A.W.B. Simpson, in the article cited earlier, suggests 
that common-law rules are inherently amorphous because they derive 
80. [d. at 95-96. 
81. [d. at 80. 
HeinOnline -- 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 380 1986-1987
380 TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 54 
from a process that leaves them open to several different formula-
tions, none of which is univocally "correct" or "authentic. "82 Here 
I differ with Simpson slightly (if I properly understand his point), in 
the sense that I believe that the announced rule in a judicial opinion 
is authoritative, prima facie. That is, the court's expression does 
display a form for the announced rule that is prima facie to be 
accepted or rejected by practitioners and citizens alike. Only, I agree 
with Simpson that these formulations of the common law need not 
be conclusive. Instead, they are defeasible. Any lawyer has the power 
to defeat them in so far as he or she can reformulate them, can show 
that the court did not mean what it said or need not have said what 
it said. Any lawyer, then, can use the accepted professional techniques 
of the common lawyer (so well-itemized by Llewellyn in his book, 
The Common Law Tradition 83) to vary the utterances of the law, by 
casting them into a better form. It is a task that need never end, 
although some formulations (e.g., Professor Gray's formulation of 
the Rule against Perpetuities84) seem to take and stick for centuries-
longevity enough even for the most rule-skeptical realist. 
But the broader point-acknowledging that lawyers can do this, 
that they have this power-is that this power comes from these 
particular techniques being applied within the medium in which they 
work. That is, these techniques are embedded in an institution (as 
Llewellyn or Wittgenstein might have said), and only so embedded 
can they be used for the formulation and reformulation of legal 
rules. This activity of defeating or revising the formulation of legal 
rules is a major part of the "common-law process." 
Llewellyn, Simpson, and White have all helped us understand 
aspects of the common-law process. 85 On my reading of ihem, ihey 
suggest a double dimension to this process. Along one line, any case 
that ends in a judicial opinion and that, hence, embodies at least one 
holding, cannot be understood solely or wholly in terms of the rule 
for which the case may be said to stand. This rule takes on importance 
and significance only in so far as it is connected with the context of 
the entire text and the entire case. The rule issues from this process 
and is not intelligible when shorn of this context. What is missing is 
its point or significance-the exact aspect of the rule that is meant 
82. Simpson, supra note 63, at 88-90. 
83. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 77-91 (1960). 
84. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942) (first 
published in 1881). 
85. I would be remiss if I neglected to mention another fine account of the 
Anglo-American common law, first published in these pages: Jones, Our Uncommon 
Common Law, 42 TENN. L. REV. 443 (1975). See a/so Jones, The Common Law in 
the United States, in POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY 91 (H.W. Jones 
ed. 1976). 
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to solve some specific legal problem. The procedural and textual 
constituents of the rule give it point and meaning. 
Along a second line, according to these writers, cases fit together 
into a series or string, and any rule of law for which any series or 
string of cases stands again cannot be understood short of embedding 
it within the historical and dialectical sequence of cases. In addition, 
each case can change over time in terms of its meaning or significance, 
depending upon how it fits into the string of cases of which it is a 
part. This change can come about simply as a consequence of adding 
a new case to the string of cases, because this addition creates a new 
context in which to read and apply the old cases forming that string. 
So, both within a single case and within a series of cases, any 
legal rule for which either stands is unintelligible shorn of such 
contextual elements. And the normativity of the law, or the norma-
tivity of legal rules, is a function of these techniques embedded in 
these practices and institutions. Hence, legal norms are normative in 
so far as they are a part of the medium of law, a part of its processes 
and methods and institutions and traditions. (They also are a matter 
of attitude, but more about this below.) Norms of law are embedded 
in the activities of law, and are not intelligible outside of an under-
standing of these matters.86 
I said above, parenthetically, that the normativity of legal rules 
depends in part upon matters of "attitude" as well as context. What 
I mean by this is that their normativity is a function, in part, of the 
attitudes of a rule's utterer and of the utterer's audience (which 
attitudes may not be the same and may in fact conflict). Stanley 
Cavell, in discussing the logic of normative utterances, speaks of this 
factor as being the "mode of presentation, "87 and it is meant to 
speak to that aspect of normative utterances that concerns the relation 
that exists, or is created, by one person confronting another and 
issuing or receiving utterances. 
I take the issue of the attitude toward law, or the "mode of 
presentation" of law, to be under scrutiny (consciously or not) in 
those positivistic and non-positivistic writings that debate whether or 
not law is the command of a sovereign to his or her subjects. 88 Hart 
gives some attention to this matter directly in his consideration of 
86. On the subject of normativity within a medium or within a narrative, I 
again am relying upon my unpublished doctoral dissertation, a major motive of 
which is to show that Wittgenstein's later philosophy is based upon such an 
understanding of norms within the medium of language. See Eisele, supra note 17. 
See also Cover, supra note 42; P. BOBBITT, supra note 74. 
87. S. CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 318-319, 323, 325 (1979). 
88. See J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832); 
HART, supra note 47, at 18-76; MacCormick, Legal Obligation and the Imperative 
Fallacy, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (2d Series) 100 (A.W.B. Simpson ed. 
1973). 
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Austin, but also when he discusses "the internal aspect of rules," 
which he finds so crucial to an understanding of the normativity of 
law. Since this is a central aspect of Hart's understanding of legal 
rules, and since it concerns our relations with legal rules, I want to 
consider in some detail a number of implications of Hart's notion. 
(1) It is reasonably clear from The Concept of Law that Hart 
means his key phrase to refer solely to the fact that we humans tend 
to, or can, internalize our rules or norms.89 They are ours in the 
quite literal sense that we incorporate them into ourselves and our 
actions, using them in our construction of the world and ourselves. 
But this is not the only implication, or even the most important 
implication, that the "internal aspect of rules" has, and I want to 
point out at least four more possible senses in which the internality 
of rules is important to our relations with law and, hence, important 
to its normativity. 
(2) We can turn the sense of Hart's phrase around by saying that 
rules incorporate us as much as we incorporate them. That is, the 
form and sense of a rule (as any expression) has something of its 
author in it, as a part of it. We put a little bit of ourselves into 
everything we say (and do). How, otherwise, could we identify people 
by means of the things they say and do? In addition, however, 
regardless of who authors a particular rule, in adopting or accepting 
it, in abiding by it, the rule absorbs us as much as we absorb it. By 
this I mean to point to the fact that we conform ourselves by acting 
and operating within a rule. I speak metaphorically here, as though 
any rule creates a space within which we can live, work, and act. (It 
does.) A rule makes possible certain forms of human action, certain 
forms of human living, that otherwise would not be possible. But 
for the rule, these forms of action and life would have no form, no 
mold in which to take place. (I recognize here, happily, a debt to 
Hart's conception of secondary, power-conferring, rules.90) 
(3) Rules have internal aspects (or relations) in yet three more 
respects. Let me focus on two of them now. First, they are internally 
related to the text in which they grow-be it a language, an opinion, 
or whatever. Here I am thinking that a rule is internal to the text 
that generates it, or in which it is generated, and that the notion of 
text, or context, can be elaborated to extend to the whole of the 
language. Rules take form and give expression and make sense only 
within a greater context, and hence are related internally to this 
context. (This is at least one implication of my readings of Llewellyn, 
Simpson, and White.) 
If the meaning of a rule is context-dependent, then the meaning 
of a legal rule depends upon Its (legal) context every bit as much as 
does the meaning of any rule. Thus, in teaching law, we try to 
89. HART, supra note 47, at 55-56, 86-88. 
90. Id. at 27-28, 30-31, 40-41, 79, 93. 
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impress upon our students (with varying success) the need to under-
stand the entire opinion or text out of which the rule speaks, be it 
statutory, constitutional, administrative, or judicial. It is not suffi-
cient for comprehending a legal rule that one knows it by heart; 
memorization is the least of our concerns. Rather, what is required 
is that we know what the rule means, and we learn this by placing 
the rule within its text or context and seeing what it means then and 
there. This situationally-specific reading is done constantly in the 
law; it is the life-blood of legal practice. Only by understanding the 
places and functions and occasions of our legal rules can we under-
stand them, their meaning for us (we who are always located within 
a particular here and now). 
(4) Second, rules are internally related to the activity or process 
through which they are generated. One can conceive of this activity 
in many different ways-from the process of argument in an opinion, 
to that of analysis, to that of reasoning or rationalizing, and so 
forth, all the way to the entire common-law process itself. All of 
these activities that generate rules are forms of life. And the rules 
cannot be understood apart from an understanding of the activities 
within which and by means of which they are generated. 
This fourth aspect of the internality of rules tells us something 
important about legal education. To master a field of law, one needs 
. to know not simply the rules of that field but also the ways in which 
the rules are used. This means, in practice, that one needs to know 
something more about the field or activity itself. Mastering a field 
of law is more than mastering its relevant rules. One must understand 
what the rules are used for and how they are used to advance or 
defeat various purposes and principles; this means learning what the 
field is about, what its purposes and roles are or may be, what its 
possibilities are, how they relate to the human beings who are looking 
to this field for relief or respite or advice or protection or escape. 
To master language, the same task must be undertaken: Knowing 
(memorizing) the words is not sufficient (although it is necessary) for 
mastery. Cavell makes this point: 
To summarize what has been said about this: In 'learning language' 
you learn not merely what the names of things are, but what a name 
is; not merely what the form of expression is for expressing a wish, 
but what expressing a wish is; not merely what the word for 'father' 
is, but what a father is; not merely what the word for 'love' is, but 
what love is. In learning language, you do not merely learn the pro-
nunciation of sounds, and their grammatical orders, but the 'forms 
of life' which make those sounds the words they are, do what they 
do-e.g., name, call, point, express a wish or affection, indicate a 
choice or an aversion, etc. And Wittgenstein sees the relations among 
these forms as 'grammatical' also. 91 
91. S. CAVELL, THE CLAIM OF REASON 177-178 (1979). 
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Of course, this kind of learning normally does not take place in 
an instant but rather is something into which every normal human 
infant matures, at his or her own rate. Legal professionals mature at 
various rates, too, in their understanding of and appreciation for the 
purposes and roles of the law in our lives. Accordingly, their knowl-
edge of legal rules is similarly variable, in so far as we are speaking 
about their capacity for using them well. 
These last two senses in which there is an internal aspect of 
rules-they are internal to their (con)text and internal to the activity 
that generates them-seem to me to be more important internal 
aspects of rules than the one emphasized by Hart. Each implies that 
we make sense of rules and use rules, within and without the law, 
by way of techniques and procedures and strategies and structures 
(texts and contexts) that are familiar to us from our experience with 
ordinary language and literature. In law, we are dealing with a 
"language of rules," as White puts it,92 but here the emphasis must 
be at least as much on "language" as it is on "rules." 
What this holistic vision of rules indicates is that rules have 
relations with many things, including ourselves, and an understanding 
of any particular rule is dependent upon understanding (at least some 
of) its many relations with those other things. This fact in itself-the 
many relations of rules-is one of the matters of "necessary knowl-
edge" about which jurisprudence should teach us. This is a part of 
our necessary knowledge of rules, what they are and how they 
function. We not only cannot deny such knowledge; we must (and 
do) employ it in our understanding of rules (consciously or not). It 
is the kind of knowledge that Wittgenstein calls "grammatical knowl-
edge. "93 We may not know (and in many situations certainly will not 
know) the particular relations that any rule has with us or its (con)text 
or the activity by which it is generated. But we do know that each 
rule must, necessarily, have such relations and that we cannot under-
stand any rule without understanding these relations. 
(5) I have not yet spoken about the fifth aspect of the internality 
of rules. 94 It is this last aspect that relates most directly to my point 
92. White, The Invisible Discourse oj the Law, 21 MICH. Q. REv. 420, 424-
433 (1982) reprinted in 54 U. COLO. L. REv. 143 (1983) and in HERACLES' Bow, 
supra note 24, at 60. See also LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra note 22, at 227-240. 
93. See text accompanying note 15 supra. 
94. It may be useful to list the five ways in which rules have an internal 
aspect: 
1. They are internalized (accepted) by us. 
2. They internalize (incorporate) us. 
3. They are internal to a (con)text. 
4. They are internal to an activity or a medium (a "form of life"). 
5. They are internal to a relationship between their author and audience. 
To my knowledge, Hart speaks about only the first of these five ways when he 
speaks in terms of the "internal aspect of rules." 
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made earlier about the attitude we have toward a rule of law (its 
"mode of presentation") and its consequent normativity. This ties in 
with my earlier discussion of White's work, where he suggests that 
any text should be understood in terms of the relationship it creates 
or embodies between. its author and its reader.95 Similarly, I suggest, 
any legal rule should be understood in terms of the relation that it 
creates or embodies between its author and its reader. We might ask, 
then, of any legal rule: How does it relate the law-giver with the law-
receiver? Here, as in any literary relationship, the relationship is not 
one-directional or one-dimensional. The reader is as involved as the 
writer in the constitution and reconstitution of his materials, of the 
text and the textual community it generates (or fails to generate). 
From this perspective, the jurisprudential discussion of law might be 
brought back to the idea (omitted from most traditional jurisprud-
ence) that any rule may be read not so much to presuppose a pre-
existing relationship between utterer and utterer's audience, as to 
create or reconstitute a relation between them. The giving of a rule, 
we might say, instantiates a relation between author and audience, 
or at least offers such a relation to them, if they know how to accept 
it and work with(in) it. Consequently, I believe, the normativity that 
any legal rule has or comes to have is in part dependent upon the 
nature of this instantiated or offered relation-what it is, what it can 
or does become. 
VIII. AN AESTHETIC APPROACH: LAW AS ART, LAW AS ACTIVITY 
I was saying earlier that I wanted to stay the natural urge, 
encouraged by the traditional, positivistic conception of law as a 
system of rules, to reify the law. I oppose the reification of law not 
because I think the law is somehow unreal, and not because I think 
the law fails to exist in the world somehow, but rather because the 
reification of law (e.g., as a system of rules) suggests the wrong kind 
of reality for law in this world. To think of the law as being an 
object-either physical or metaphysical-is to ascribe to law the 
wrong kind of reality and the wrong kind of existence. This ascription 
creates an analogy between objects and law that does not hold. 
Another way to put it would be to say that this ascription or analogy 
presents the wrong kind of model for law; it is misleading and, thus, 
it skews our vision and our expectations of law. 
What, specifically, is wrong with this model of law? My sugges-
tion has been that to talk about law as an object naturally leads us 
to think in terms of physical objects, and then all of the familiar 
associations that we have with such objects-what we know about 
them, how we come to know them, and so forth-inundate us. We 
95. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra. 
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tend to transfer the relations that we have with physical objects to 
our relations with law. Then we try to make law fit their mold, 
which it cannot do; hence, we become disappointed in law, as though 
it had failed us (whereas, what has happened is that we have failed 
it, naturally). We become dissatisfied with law because it does not 
permit the kinds of knowledge (by which I mean, the forms and 
methods and modes of knowledge) permitted us by physical objects. 
This fact of the difference between law and physical objects is 
signaled to us-though not always recognized by us-by the now 
common acknowledgment that law is not and cannot be a science, 
especially not a natural science but also not a social science (the 
latter of which models its epistemological methods and goals on those 
of the former). 
Law is not a physical object, nor is it akin to one. Neither is law 
a rule or system of rules. And, even if law tends to become embodied, 
in part, as a system of rules, traditional jurisprudence has miscon-
ceived what rules are and how they work (that is, how they relate to 
us and we to them). What my remarks amount to, I believe, is a 
claim that law is not independent of humans.96 That it ever could be 
conceived to be otherwise, may seem a mystery, but I read traditional 
jurisprudence to have treated law exactly as though it were independ-
ent of us. This conception has misconstrued law and misled us in 
ways and about matters that we are only beginning to appreciate and 
assess. I hope that I have made a contribution to this work of 
assessment. 
I also have been trying to show that, given the work of a number 
of people, we can see law as being something other than independent 
of us. On this alternative view, law consists of artistic activities and 
their products-that is, not only the rules of law but also the 
practices, institutions, experiences, and language by which and in 
which such rules are made, applied, repealed, and denied. Law 
includes the activities through which law is created or made and by 
which law is maintained, modified, repealed, affirmed, etc. Given 
that human actions and activities are not physical objects as trees or 
rocks are, nor physical processes or causal phenomena as lightning 
or gravity are, and also given that human activities are not reducible 
to their results or products, we are mistaken to treat law as either a 
physical or metaphysical object-a mere result or product. 
An artistic activity issues in an utterance with an intentional 
dimension that physical objects and causal phenomena do not have. 
On this view, law becomes connected both to humans and to its 
96. This is true of natural law as well as positive law. even if (as I claim) 
natural law is to be thought of as the necessary conditions and limits of law. I hope 
to make more clear this conception of "natural law as necessary" in the paper 
mentioned in note 65 supra. 
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appearances and places within human contexts and forms of life. The 
law is not a phenomenon separate from us and our participation in 
it. We cannot know this art or activity and its artifacts without also 
knowing its audience and its artists. (This is an attempt to acknowl-
edge "the hard Berkeleyan-Kantian truth that an event in which we 
participate is not knowable apart from our participation in it. "97) 
The emphasis that traditional jurisprudence places on rules in the 
law can be traced to its concern with the normativity of law. How 
are we to account for the normative claim that law makes on us? 
Philip Soper has argued that this is the fundamental issue of juris-
prudence today, and that the epistemological emphasis of traditional 
jurisprudence improperly distracts our attention from the moral-
political issue of how law obligates US. 98 
Practitioners of traditional jurisprudence have pursued the ques-
tion of the normativity of law along one line of development only, 
namely, in terms of the obligatoriness of law (as a moral-political 
problem). No doubt, it is important, even crucial, for us to under-
stand the obligatoriness (or non-obligatoriness) of law, of our rules 
of law. But obligation is not the only normative value that law has. 
To call the law "normative" is to say, I believe, that law is a 
medium, a collection of ways for human beings to act, and that law 
provides us with norms of human action or activity. It does this not 
only in the sense that it affords us already determined modes of 
human action, already determined and specified ways of acting, but 
also in the sense in which law affords us the materials by which we 
can construct or invent or discover new ways of acting, new modes 
of human activity. (And, of course, I mean nothing invidious by the 
term "new," because it is also a part of the fecundity of law to offer 
us the opportunity to discover or reinvent old ways of acting, old 
modes of human activity, ways and norms that had been alive to 
humans in the past but, for whatever reason, are lost to us for the 
time being until we reclaim them from the fund we call "history" or 
"tradition. ") 
Norms come in all shapes and sizes, all forms and functions, and 
they need not be either moral or political. Some legal norms are 
aesthetic. Our over-emphasis on the moral dimension of norms, and 
on their political dimension, leads us to neglect their other normative 
dimensions;99 it also reinforces the moralization and politicization of 
law, as though law could only be measured along either or both of 
these normative dimensions, and must otherwise be neutral, value-
free. On my understanding, however, norms are specifications of the 
97. S. CAVELL, THE WORLD VIEWED 128 (1971). 
98. SOPER, supra note 5, at 7, 9-11, 19, 101. 
99. See, e.g., Coyne, Beyond Rules: Mapping the Normative, 18 AM. PHn. 
Q. 331 (1981). 
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ways in which we do things, the ways we have for accomplishing 
efficient and effective human actions, the ways we have of reaching 
and achieving our goals and purposes. To say that all norms are 
either moral or political or both is wrong, yet such a view seems 
implicit in much of the jurisprudential talk about the normativity of 
law. 
The assumption in traditional jurisprudence is that we need to 
explain or account for why and how we follow laws. To show why 
and how a certain rule of law obligates or binds us is a prima facie 
reason for following it. The problem with this model of law and 
legal rules is that the questions that citizens and legal professionals 
ask of the law do not all reduce to the question, "How am I (or 
how is my client) to follow this rule, and why should I (or he)?" 
What else might be asked of law and legal rules? We ask of law 
not only, "What must I do?", but also, "What can I do?" We ask, 
then, not only about what is required'by law, or what is permissible 
by law, but also about what is possible within the medium of law. 
We may legitimately wonder how we are to do what we want to do, 
and thus may look to the law for assistance in constructing ways of 
achieving what we desire. This is an aesthetic approach to law, 
because it assumes law to be an artistic medium of expression and 
communication, a way of making sense and creating significance in 
the world. Also, it insists upon the creativity and criticism of law 
from within an appreciation that these values are to be achieved-
and can be achieved-only through an attention to craft, to craft-
manship and professional technique. 
This aesthetic approach to law asks not "How am I to follow 
the law?", but, "What can I do with the law? How can I work with 
it?" This is the professional's question, to be sure, but it also is a 
question that citizens can ask. It sees the relation between humans 
and the law not as a passive or submissive one, but rather as a 
participatory and active one. We wish to work with it, not allow it 
to have its way with us. 
The question of how law binds us, how it obligates us-the extent 
to which it does-is important, but I doubt that it is exhaustive of 
the fundamental questions that can be asked about the normativity 
of law. In fact, I take the problem of legal obligation to be only one 
among several problems of legal normativity. Since normativity is a 
concept that concerns human action and activity-its forms and 
methods, its intentions and purposes and goals and accomplishments 
and failures and consequences-I consider the more fundamental 
question of jurisprudence to be: "What is the nature of law such 
that we can undertake the actions and activities within it that we in 
fact undertake?" In this respect, I am looking for an account of law 
as a medium of human life, thought, and action. Such an account 
would have to understand law as one field of human activity among 
many, and would have to locate it accordingly. 
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I am claiming that law itself is an activity, an activity of artistry. 
Oakeshott suggests a way of fruitfully pursuing such a conception. 
While it is clear that a part of our legal knowledge and legal education 
is expressed in and by the rules of law that we study, it also is clear 
that these rules are not sufficient in themselves to produce or repre-
sent our knowledge of law or of an education in the law. To know 
the activity of the law, we shall have to know how we teach it, how 
we learn it, and how we practice it. Thus, among other things, to 
learn what law is, which puzzles us, we shall have to learn what the 
activity of being a lawyer is, a still more puzzling matter. 
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